CONGRESS AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: An Exercise in Symbolic Politics

Even when federal authorities were legally empowered to impose a death sentence, the sanction was rarely carried out. Between 1930 and 1976, there were only 33 such executions. During the past decade, bills, both imposing and abolishing capital punishment, have been introduced repeatedly in the U.S. Congress. Furthermore, certain members of Congress have demonstrated intense interest in such efforts. The continued debate and interest is better explained by the symbolic rather than tangible components of such legislation. This article examines four aspects of the symbolic component of federal death penalty legislation: reassurance function, moral-educative function, model for the states, and the deterrence debate.     

TESTING CONTROL THEORY AND DIFFERENTIAL ASSOCIATION: A REANALYSIS OF THE RICHMOND YOUTH PROJECT DATA*

In what has become a classic work in the field, Matsueda (1982) tested control theory against differential association theory using Hirschi's (1969) Richmond Youth Project data. Matsueda found that measures of “definitions favorable to law violation” entirely mediated the effect of his social control measures and friends' delinquency, and concluded that differential association theory was supported over control theory. We note several problems with Matsueda's specification of control theory, and we reanalyze the Richmond data including measures of commitment to conventional goals and several attachment to parents variables that Matsueda excluded. We also propose and test a new method of measuring the social bond, conceptualizing the social bond as a second-order latent construct. In contrast with Matsueda's findings, we find that the social bond and friends' delinquency retain important direct effects on delinquency, and that these effects are greater than those of definitions. Thus, our results are more supportive of control theory than differential association theory.     

Governments and unpopular social policy reform: Biting the bullet or steering clear?

Abstract. Under which conditions and to what extent do governments pursue unpopular social policy reforms for which they might be punished in the next election? This article shows that there exists substantial cross‐cabinet variation in the degree to which governments take unpopular measures and argues that current studies cannot adequately explain this variation. Using insights from prospect theory, a psychological theory of choice under risk, this study hypothesises that governments only engage in unpopular reform if they face a deteriorating socio‐economic situation, a falling political position, or both. If not, they shy away from the risk of reform. A fuzzy‐set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) of the social policy reform activities pursued by German, Dutch, Danish and British cabinets between 1979 and 2005 identifies a deteriorating socio‐economic situation as necessary for unpopular reform. It is only sufficient for triggering reform, however, if the political position is also deteriorating and/or the cabinet is of rightist composition. This study's findings further the scholarly debate on the politics of welfare state reform by offering a micro‐foundation that helps one to understand what induces political actors aspiring to be re‐elected to engage in electorally risky unpopular reform.