AGE,PERIOD, AND COHORT EFFECTS ON DEATH PENALTY ATTITUDES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1974–2014

In this article, we further the understanding of both changes in public opinion on capital punishment in the United States and changes in the factors associated with public opinion on the death penalty. Support for the death penalty may be motivated by events happening during specific time periods, and it can vary across birth cohorts as a result of cohort‐specific socialization processes, demographic changes, and formative events that are specific to each generation. An explication of the sources of and variation in death penalty attitudes over time would benefit from the accounting for the age of the respondent, the year of the survey response, and the birth cohort of the respondent. We improve on previous research by using multiple approaches including hierarchical age–period–cohort models and data from the General Social Survey (N = 41,474) to examine changes in death penalty attitudes over time and across birth cohorts. The results showed curvilinear age effects, strong period effects, and weak cohort effects on death penalty support. The violent crime rate explained much of the variation in support for the death penalty across periods. The examination of subgroup differences suggests that support for the death penalty is becoming concentrated among Whites, Protestants, and Republicans.     

Riding the Rails

My seat was in the full, upright position as one of the attendants came by. I showed her my ticket,to which she smiled and said, "Enjoy your trip." The seat was spacious and comfortable.     

Business Associations and the Decentralization of Penury: Functional Groups and Territorial Interests

This article compares the responses of subnational business interest associations (BIAs) in declining industrial regions to the demotion of centrally-administered regional economic policy in favor of regional and local initiatives — a "decentralization of penury"— in Great Britain and West Germany. As an organization that represents chiefly functional membership interests, a BIA is not the most obvious candidate for economic initiatives based on territory. Drawing on a comparison of BIAs in two British administrative regions and two German Länder , I discuss the mix of elements that influence whether business is capable of fighting out politics about territory across territory, either on a local or regional basis. The analytical framework employed is based on Schmitter and Streeck's logics of membership and influence. The findings suggest that business associations formulate and pursue territorial economic interests consistently, yet face powerful constraints generated by their relations with members and by central government policies. Where the spatial economic interests of business are concerned, BIAs in both countries, despite the clear differences in organizational properties and capabilities, are best able to balance the tensions generated by the two logics when government policy encourages a local focus.     

Fireworks and Festivals and Tigers! Oh My!

The barrage started on a Friday morning——a few distant booms that soon led to louder explosions and fizzling sounds drawing closer to my apartment. As the day progressed, sotoo did their frequency until night fell and a     

Humanitarian Intervention and Communal Civil Wars:

How do policymakers in democratic nations mobilize support for hard-line strategies? Existing answers to this question emphasize the exaggeration of external threats. Yet this overlooks an important dilemma: because democratic citizens expect their leaders to explore peaceful solutions or less aggressive alternatives when foreign dangers are ambiguous, the same conditions that make threat inflation necessary also make it difficult to employ successfully. To mobilize support for hard-line measures when the public wants its leaders to demonstrate restraint, policymakers may therefore attempt to shift blame onto an adversary by using “counterfeit diplomacy.” Specifically, democratic leaders may adopt more cooperative or less coercive options than they believe are necessary, but which they anticipate will fail. This approach can be a risky one, however, because an opponent might accept a nation's demands, accede to its conditions, or offer counterproposals in the hope of diffusing support for more confrontational measures.