Darker Legacies of Law in Europe. The Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism over Europe and Its Legal Traditions

Eds. Christian Joerges and Navraj Singh Ghaleigh. With a Prologue by Michael Stolleis and an Epilogue by Joseph H. H. Weiler. Oxford: Hart. 2003. Pp. 416.     

RACIAL THREAT,CONCENTRATED DISADVANTAGE AND SOCIAL CONTROL: CONSIDERING THE MACRO‐LEVEL SOURCES OF VARIATION IN ARRESTS*

Several studies have examined the relationship between racial threat (measured by the size of black population) and social control imposed on blacks, but evidence of this hypothesis has been mixed. Although dependency on percent black as the main indicator of racial threat in many studies has contributed to the inconsistency in findings, we argue that this literature has also neglected to consider other important conceptual and methodological issues. Using 2000 census and arrest data, we estimate the impact of multiple measures of racial economic threat, such as the size of the black population, racial inequality and black immigration patterns on black arrest rates. Furthermore, by integrating racial competition and race‐relations arguments, we examine how the concentration of black disadvantage may temper the extent to which blacks pose a threat to white interests. Our findings reveal important and conceptually distinct relationships between racial threat, concentrated disadvantage and the use of social control against blacks, particularly when compared to white arrests.     

Expert Policy Analysis and Bureaucratic Politics: Searching for the Causes of the 1987 Stock Market Crash

Shortly after the 1987 stock market crash four government agencies published studies analyzing the causes of the crash. Their analyses and explanations were at odds with each other. This article explores how weak theory, the methodological variations, and problem definition fed the political orientations of the agencies and shaped the agencies' analyses. Basically it shows how sophisticated policy analysis can serve political and bureaucratic ends.     

The Contingent Diffusion of Parliamentary Oversight Institutions in the European Union

What explains the variation in institutional adaptation of national parliaments to European integration? Whereas the existing literature has mainly focused on domestic conditions, this article explains institutional adaptation to integration by focusing on inter‐parliamentary diffusion. The argument draws on ‘learning’ mechanisms of diffusion on the demand side and on ‘emulation’ mechanisms on the supply side. Parliamentary demand for external inspiration is related to uncertainty about functional oversight institutions, and the selection of sources to perceptions of similarity and success. Demand arises in new European Union member parliaments and young democracies that then turn towards culturally alike countries and old democracies. Using spatial econometrics, support is demonstrated for the argument in the article while ruling out alternative diffusion mechanisms such as spatial proximity and learning from Scandinavian frontrunners once links along cultural similarity and democratic experience are controlled for. The results underline the limits of the ‘isolated polity’ approach in the comparative study of institutions in Europe's closely integrated political system, while also showing that, even in this favourable environment, diffusion pathways are contingent on the mechanisms generating demand among policy makers and shaping their selection of sources for external information.     

From capacity to sovereignty: Legislative politics and differentiated integration in the European Union

The literature suggests that legislative politics among European Union Member States is characterised by economic exchanges, and constrained by the social norms of a European community of legislators. Both views draw a clear line between the legislative process and the conflicts over sovereignty that have left their mark on treaty making and European public opinion since the 1990s. This article suggests revisiting this view, based on an analysis of why Member States have opted out of legislation from the 1970s to today. It argues that differentiation, while once a response to capacity problems of relatively poor countries, has recently become driven by sovereignty concerns of the Union's wealthy and nationally oriented Members that oppose the EU's intrusion into core state powers. The article presents evidence for the impact on legislative outcomes of factors so far thought not to matter. The results indicate greater European‐level legislative responsiveness towards national sovereignty demands than previously recognised. They underline that the nature of European politics has been changing with the EU's push into core state powers.     

Are Europeans ready for a more democratic European Union? New evidence on preference heterogeneity,polarisation and crosscuttingness

Some scholars and policy makers argue in favour of increasing democratic contestation for leadership and policy at the European level, for instance by having European‐wide parties campaign for competing candidates for President of the European Commission ahead of European Parliament elections. But do such changes put the survival of the European Union at risk? According to the consociational interpretation of the EU, the near absence of competitive and majoritarian elements has been a necessary condition for the stability of the EU political system given its highly diverse population. This article contributes to the debate in two ways. First, it develops a more precise understanding of ‘problematic’ diversity by examining how three variables – the heterogeneity, polarisation and crosscuttingness of citizen preferences over public polices – affect the risk of democratic contestation generating persistent and systematically dissatisfied minorities. Second, it uses opinion surveys to determine whether the degree of diversity of the European population is problematically high compared to that of established democratic states. It is found that the population of the EU is slightly more heterogeneous and polarised than the population of the average Member State, although policy preferences in several Member States are more heterogeneous and polarised than the EU as a whole. Strikingly, however, policy preference cleavages are more crosscutting in the EU than in nearly all Member States, reducing the risk of persistent minorities. Moreover, policy preferences tend to be less heterogeneous and polarised, and nearly as crosscutting, in the EU as a whole as in the United States. For observers worried about how high polarisation and low crosscuttingness in policy preferences may combine to threaten democratic stability, these findings should be reassuring.     

INCENTIVES FOR COLLECTIVE DEVIANCE: GROUP SIZE AND CHANGES IN PERCEIVED RISK,COST, AND REWARD*

Research has demonstrated that the presence of others shifts decision‐making about risky/deviant behavior. One reason for this shift could be changes in the anticipated experience of formal sanctions, informal costs, and rewards. To investigate this possibility, this study conducted two randomized controlled trials with hypothetical vignettes, in which a range of how many other people were also involved in the criminal act defined the treatment conditions. Across two samples of university students (Ns = 396 and 263), the results revealed that as the size of the involved group increased, the anticipated experience of sanction risk and several informal social costs associated with engaging in the act decreased, and the anticipated experience of two rewards increased. Additional analyses suggest that, with one exception in each data set, these changes are not only tied to the solo/group distinction.