MANAGING RETALIATION: DRUG ROBBERY AND INFORMAL SANCTION THREATS*

The notion that informal sanction threats influence criminal decision‐making is perhaps the most important contribution to neoclassical theory in the past 15 years. Notably absent from this contribution is an examination of the ways in which the risk of victim retaliation—arguably, the ultimate informal sanction—mediates the process. The present article addresses this gap, examining how active drug robbers (individuals who take money and drugs from dealers by force or threat of force) perceive and respond to the risk of victim retaliation in real‐life settings and circumstances. The data's theoretical implications for deterrence and violence contagions are explored. Data were drawn from in‐depth interviews with 25 currently active drug robbers recruited from the streets of St. Louis, Missouri.     

CRACK DEALERS AND RESTRICTIVE DETERRENCE: IDENTIFYING NARCS*

Data drawn from semistructured interviews with 40 active street-level crack dealers are used to illustrate, apply, and expand the concept of restrictive deterrence. The article focuses on the perceptual shorthand dealers use to determine whether buyers in question are “narcs.” In presenting this shorthand, the article seeks to demonstrate how interactions among marketplace democratization (i.e., the idea of selling to as many different customers as possible to maximize profits), marketplace volatility, transactional brevity, and threats from law enforcement affect its complexity and refinement. Respondents operated out of a medium-sized, midwestern metropolitan area (population: 2.2 million) within a central city of 390,000.     

Road to Ruin? A Spatial Analysis of State Highway Spending

Do states engage in infrastructure expenditure competition to attract new economic activity? Economic theory is inconclusive on the matter. States might respond to increased infrastructure spending in competitor states by increasing their own infrastructure spending. Conversely, states may decrease spending in the presence of positive spillovers from competitor states' infrastructure investment. Using spatial econometric techniques and focusing specifically on highway spending, we demonstrate that states expend less on highways when spending in neighboring states increases. We explore this possibility further by modeling state personal income growth as a function of own‐state and neighbor‐state highway spending. Our findings suggest positive spillovers influence interstate relationships for highway spending rather than race‐to‐the‐top competition for economic activity.     

Stoned Rosy in Beijing

JAWS dropped when the bill wasannounced mid-August.Howdid the organizers of the newly-sprung Beijing Pop Festival landone of Britain's biggest rocknames for its first edition?Still more sur-prising,Ian Brown would be coming toChina barely a week after he'd releasedhis latest album,Greatest,a time usuallytaken up with press conferences.Brown actually chose Beijing overthe promotional rounds of European ra-dio and television stations.The day-longevent he headlined at Chaoyang Parkon Septe…     

A Political-Institutional Framework for the Analysis of Competition Policy Institutions

The article presents an eight-point analytical framework for the examination of key political-institutional aspects of the functioning of national competition policy institutions. These are assessed against the competition policy regimes of the EC, UK, Germany, and, to a lesser extent, the US. Each element represents an aspect or institutional arena in which there is potential andlor actual room for the exercise of political influence and power in an increasingly important realm of micro-economic governance. Such political arenas and channels are woven in and around a set of competition authorities in each county or jurisdiction otherwise primarily attempting to apply economic analysis to numerous specific case decisions. The eight elements of the framework are: 1) the use of explicit non-competition criteria that can be taken into account by competition authorities; 2) ranges of, and opportunities for, ministerial discretion; 3) intra-cabinet and intra-govern-mental pressures from other ministers and departments and their political clientele interests; 4) direct hearings or avenues for direct representation and pressure by interests; 5) opportunities for private legal action; 6) processes for giving comfort or guidance letters to private parties; 7) vehicles for pressure and political learning through studies, media exposure, and public persuasion; and 8) the extent to which “one-stop” versus multi-sector competition institutions exist and can be played off one another.     

The meaning and measure of state legitimacy: Results for 72 countries

Abstract.  This article presents a quantitative measurement of the political legitimacy of states in the late 1990s and early 2000s for 72 states containing 5.1 billion people, or 83 per cent of the world's population. First, the concept of state legitimacy is defined and justified. The definition includes the subjects, objects and sub-types of legitimacy. A strategy to achieve replicable cross-national measurements of legitimacy is then outlined and implemented, including a discussion of data sources and three alternative aggregation methods. The results are briefly examined and tested, and the uncertainties of quantitative measures discussed. Finally, the role of supplementary qualitative measurement is considered.     

The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism

This article assesses current trends and developments in terrorism within the context of the overall progress being achieved in the global war on terrorism (GWOT). It examines first the transformation that Al Qaeda has achieved in the time since the 11 September 2001 attacks and the variety of affiliated or associated groups (e.g., what are often referred to as Al Qaeda "clones" or "franchises") that have emerged to prosecute the jihadist struggle. It then focuses on recent developments in Saudi Arabia and especially Iraq in order to shed further light on Al Qaeda's current strategy and operations. In conclusion, this article offers some broad recommendations regarding the future conduct of the GWOT.­