Red tape and technology transfer in US government laboratories

The purpose of this paper is to gauge the effects of red tape and bureaucratization on the technology-transfer activities and effectiveness of government laboratories in the United States. Two central questions are addressed: Do laboratories involved significantly in technology transfer have more red tape than others? and Does the level of red tape have an effect on technology-transfer success? Objective and perceptual measures of red tape are used. Technologytransfer effectiveness is measured in terms of getting other organizations to adopt technology developed in the laboratory (“out the door” success) and of the commercial impact of transfers. Data are derived from questionnaire responses provided by directors of 276 federal- and state-government laboratories. Results indicate that laboratories involved in technology transfer do not have higher levels of red tape. Out-the-door technology-transfer success relates strongly to low degrees of perceived red tape, whereas high ratings for commercial impact are associated with actual low levels of red tape in acquiring project funding and lowcost equipment.     

Company interactions with federal laboratories: What they do and why they do it

Focusing on responses from 229 companies that have worked with federal laboratories, the study examines companies' objectives and initial motivations for technical interaction between companies and federal laboratories. Companies come to the federal laboratories for many reasons: some try to enhance their training and human capital, others to build precompetitive knowledge not likely to show a quick return, and still others to avail themselves of unique lab facilities or seek technical assistance. One implication of these findings is that the traditional view of technology transfer may distort the nature of commercially relevant technical interactions, particularly in an era characterized by rampant “metricmania.” Any assessment of company-laboratory interactions failing to take into account the multiple objectives of many different technical interactions is likely to hinder as much as it helps.     

Forensic Mental Health Clinical Evaluation: An Analysis of Interstate and Intersystemic Differences

Forensic mental health evaluation systems have undergone major changes during the past two decades, and the variability of service delivery systems across states is significant. We compared assessments of competence to stand trial and criminal responsibility in three states with different systems for forensic mental health evaluations: Michigan, Ohio, and Virginia. Although all three states use comparable legal criteria to judge competence and criminal responsibility, we found large, statistically significant differences among the states in the proportion of defendants referred for evaluation who were assessed as incompetent or not criminally responsible. In addition, significant differences were found in the diagnostic and offense categories of defendants referred for evaluation. Our findings suggest that the structure of a system for providing forensic evaluation services may significantly affect both the group of individuals referred for evaluation as well as evaluation outcome.     

A rent-seeking model of TELs

Tax and expenditure limits or TELs are constitutional or statutory constraints on the fiscal powers of government. Since the taxpayer revolt beginning in the late 1970s, TELs have been introduced in twenty-three states. In recent years a number of studies attempting to test the impact of TELs have found little evidence that TELs significantly reduced the growth of state government. In this study we challenge the implicit Leviathan model that underlies most of these studies, and offer an alternative rent-seeking model. Econometric tests provide support for this rentseeking model, and indicate that TELs have been significant in reducing the growth of state government, at least in the short run. “... the very principle of constitutional government requires it to be assumed, that political power will be abused to promote the particular purpose of the holder; not because it always is so, but because such is the natural tendency of things, to guard against which is the especial use of free institutions”