Inferring Transition Probabilities from Repeated Cross Sections

This paper discusses a nonstationary, heterogeneous Markov modeldesigned to estimate entry and exit transition probabilitiesat the micro level from a time series of independent cross-sectionalsamples with a binary outcome variable. The model has its originsin the work of Moffitt and shares features with standard statisticalmethods for ecological inference. We outline the methodologicalframework proposed by Moffitt and present several extensionsof the model to increase its potential application in a widerarray of research contexts. We also discuss the relationshipwith previous lines of related research in political science.The example illustration uses survey data on American presidentialvote intentions from a five-wave panel study conducted by Pattersonin 1976. We treat the panel data as independent cross sectionsand compare the estimates of the Markov model with both dynamicpanel parameter estimates and the actual observations in thepanel. The results suggest that the proposed model providesa useful framework for the analysis of transitions in repeatedcross sections. Open problems requiring further study are discussed.     

大数据在应急管理中的应用

当前大数据正在改变世界,而数据收集和分析则是提升应急管理功能的重要手段。在对大数据内涵和具体案例进行分析后就会发现,大数据在应急管理中的应用主要有大数据技术和大数据思维两种方式。在应急管理的事前准备、事中响应和事后救援与恢复的每一阶段都可以引入大数据的应用,每个阶段对大数据的应用程度也会因其需要应对内容的不同而有所差别。大数据的应用有助于提高应急管理效率、节省成本和减少损失。我国需要在大数据战略、大数据开放政策、大数据在应急管理中具体应用形式等方面做出部署与探索。     

When Second‐Best is Still a No‐Brainer: Why Labour Should Shoot for a Majority Coalition in May 2015

The chances of Labour winning the 2015 general election with a comfortable overall majority are vanishingly small. It could, however, emerge as the largest party or finish just a handful of seats behind the Conservatives. Either scenario would give it at least a chance—and a bigger chance than many realise, we argue—of forming a government. In that event, Labour may be faced with a choice between getting together with another party (or parties) to form a majority coalition or else forming a minority government (either on its own or with one or more partners), which could assemble different majorities for different pieces of legislation or try to negotiate a ‘confidence and supply’ agreement. Given the precedents from the UK and overseas, we argue that, faced with this dilemma, Labour should do all it can to form a majority coalition. We also argue that Labour can learn some useful lessons from the Cameron–Clegg coalition.     

Confrontation by default and confrontation by design: strategic and institutional responses to Poland's populist coalition government

For a short and controversial period in 2006–2007, Poland was governed by a three-party “populist coalition” which attempted to break with the liberal-democratic model of post-communist transition and implement a far-reaching set of reforms. In this article, I analyse the ways in which domestic and external actors responded to the challenges posed by this coalition. I argue that Poland's Constitutional Court and the temporarily united opposition parties were key to repelling the populist challenge. However, the anti-populist response was driven less by a deliberate strategy than by the confrontational logic of populism itself, and the institutional design of Poland's liberal-democratic system. I conclude with a discussion of several lessons the Polish case holds for further analyses of anti-populist reaction.     

Low Power,First Offers,and Reservation Prices: Weak Negotiators are Self-anchored by Their Own Alternatives

Although most scholars recommend making the first offer in negotiations, recent research and practitioners' experience have uncovered a second-mover advantage in certain situations. In the current article, we explore this first- versus second-mover dynamic by investigating the circumstances under which negotiators would make less favorable first offers than they would receive were they to move second, focusing on the effects of negotiation power in the form of alternatives. Additionally, we examine the effects of low power on reservation prices and whether these effects could be mitigated using an anchor-debiasing technique. In Study 1, we manipulated negotiators' power in the form of the best alternative to the negotiated agreement and examined its effect on first offers and reservation prices. Our results showed that low-power negotiators would receive more favorable first offers than they would have made themselves when facing either low- or medium-power counterparts. Also, our results suggest that low-power negotiators had less favorable reservation prices than their medium- and high- power counterparts. In Study 2, we investigated whether this effect would persist in the face of anchor-debiasing techniques. Our results showed that while anchor-debiasing techniques did improve their first offers, low-power negotiators would still benefit from making the counteroffer rather than moving first. Our findings uncover the disadvantageous effects of low power on first-offer magnitude while offering practical advice to negotiators.