A Switch in Time Saves Nine: Institutions,Strategic Actors,and FDR's Court-Packing Plan

President Roosevelt's attempt to add asmany as six additional justices to theSupreme Court through his infamous``court-packing plan'' of 1937 has long beenheralded as a misuse of presidential powerthat nearly undermined the integrity of ourconstitutional system. Using an analyticnarrative framework, we offer analternative theoretical account of theevents and argue that Roosevelt used theproposal to obtain his immediate goal: ashift in policy direction of the Court. Our framework is supported with historicalevidence, suggesting that all of the actorswere acting rationally by attempting tomaximize their payoffs.     

Competition and Monopoly Power in Local Government: An Extension of Caplan (2001)

Caplan (2001) shows that because land is asource of immobile wealth, localgovernments can use the property tax toavoid competitive pressures of the Tieboutmodel, allowing them to deviate fromcitizens' preferences. In this comment Ishow that the property tax is not the onlytax local governments can use to avoidcompetitive pressure. Most taxes placed onproperty owners allow local governments toextract some rents despite perfect citizenmobility.     

Estimating the Effects of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993

Over-time and multivariate cross-sectional analyses of large survey samples are used to estimate the likely effects of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) by examining turnout in those states where procedures comparable to any of the act's provisions were in force in 1992. In contrast to previous studies, we find that most state motor voter programs did not resemble the NVRA provision. We analyze one state program that did, and in addition use election-day registration as a surrogate, because it also provides one-trip voting. Our two approaches lead to estimates of turnout increases due to the motor voter provision of 4.7 and 8.7 percentage points, respectively. The lack of state counterparts to public agency registration prevents estimates of this provision's consequences. Eliminating purging for not voting will increase turnout by as much as 2 percentage points. Universal mail registration will have no effect. The turnout effects will be greatest among the two largest groups of current nonvoters: people under the age of 30 and those who moved within two years of election day. Neither group is politically distinctive, except for young people's weaker identification with the major parties and greater affinity for third-party candidates.     

Reducing delay in the administration of justice: The case of Uganda

This is a revised version of a paper presented at a conference organized by the Society for the Reform of Criminal Law on Criminal Law Reform in Southern Africa, Windhoek, Namibia, June 15–17, 1992.