Policy process perceptions of senior Canadian federal civil servants: a view of the state and its environment

Abstract: Based on interviews with senior civil federal civil servants in Ottawa, perceptions of various actors' influence on public policy are examined. It is hypothesized that perceived influence patterns will change as one moves across the major phases of the policy process. Although it is expected that actors within the state will be of primary importance throughout the process, it is also expected that the relative importance of actors outside the state will increase as one moves from forming a policy agenda and selecting policy towards policy implementation. This should be particularly true of the perceived influence of private companies. Despite this change in perceived levels of influence of state versus non-state actors, the structure of correlation patterns for perceived influence patterns will probably not change dramatically from one policy process phase to the next. Results are also presented pertaining to the actual interaction patterns of the civil servants who were interviewed, as well as the relation between interaction and perceived influence. It is expected that there will be positive relations between these two types of variables but that direct interaction will not consistently explain the majority of variation in perceived influence variables. Sommaire: À la suite d'entrevues avec des hauts fonctionnaires fédéraux à Ottawa, on examine ici les perceptions quant à l'influence de divers intervenants sur les politiques gouvernementales. On prend pour hypothèse que ces perceptions évolueront à mesure que l'on avance d'une grande étape à l'autre dans le processus de définition des politiques. On s'attend à ce que les intervenants étatiques jouent un rôle primordial tout au long du processus, mais aussi à ce que le rôle relatif des intervenants extérieurs au gouvernement prenne de l'ampleur lorsqu'on passe de l'établissement d'une liste de politiques au choix des politiques elles-mêmes et, en?fin, à la mise en oeuvre de ces politiques. Ceci devrait s'appliquer tout particulièrement à la manière dont on perçoit l'influence des sociétés privées. Malgré ce changement du niveau d'influence perçu entre les intervenants gouvernementaux et les nongouvernementaux, la structure corrélative des influences perçues ne changera probablement pas de façon dramatique d'une étape à l'autre du processus d'élaboration des politiques. On présente également des résultats concernant l'interaction effective des fonctionnaires interviewés, ainsi que le rapport entre cette interaction et l'influence perçue. On prévoit des rapports positifs entre ces deux groupes de variables, mais aussi que l'interaction directe ne saurait expliquer de manière cohérente la plupart des variations dans les variables de l'influence perçue.     

Politics and the rescue of insolvent savings and loans before 1989

The results presented in this paper are consistent with those predicted by public choice economists who believe that regulatory agencies represent the interests of their controlling congressional committees. Membership on committees is not random; congressmen seek committee assignments where they can represent the interests of their constituency. Congressmen from states where financial institutions are significant will seek membership on their respective banking committees. Once on those committees, congressmen will seek to protect and promote their own constituency. In the case of the savings and loan industry, insolvent savings and loans received benefits from staying in operation. These savings and loans gained another chance to gamble for resurrection. Being shut-down or placed in a management consignment program did not give this option. The results presented in our paper indicate that participation in one of the rescue programs is not random. Savings and loans in states with political power (representation on the Senate banking committee) are less likely to be resolved.A previous version of this paper was presented at the Southern Economic Association Meetings, November 18–21 1990, New Orleans, Louisiana. The authors thank James R. Barth, Henry N. Butler, Gordon Tullock, Lawrence J. White, and an anonymous referee, for helpful comments. Financial support from the Summer Research Program of the College of Business, Boise State University, is gratefully acknowledged. We accept responsibility for any remaining errors.