With Revolutionary Battery Tech,We Can Shift Global Energy To Renewables

Inventor and investor Bill Joy describes a breakthrough technology that can speed the de‐carbonization of the planet.     

Civil wars,party politics and the consolidation of regimes in twentieth century Europe

The present article explores how winners' and losers' strategies for competition influence the possibility of democratization after civil war. Civil wars have been pivotal events in many states, but there has been little analysis of how they affect democratization. Since most have been won by the political right in twentieth century Europe one expects a correlation between civil war and the imposition of authoritarian solution to political conflicts. However, an analysis of five civil wars shows a wide variety in the patterns of political dominance achieved by the winners, ranging from total clampdown in Spain to the winners relinquishing power, as in Ireland. In between, Finland, Greece and Hungary combined various degrees of open competition with restrictions on the losers. In effect democratization can be as likely an outcome of civil war as regression to authoritarianism. Explaining the variation in outcomes of the five cases is the objective of this article.     

Do Debt Levels Influence State Borrowing Costs?

This article reports on research into the possible interest cost penalties when state governments impose increasingly high debt levels on their citizens. The potential effect of debt levels on borrowing costs is a material one, given the large amounts of state debt outstanding. At the same time that government borrowing is heavy, the demand for government obligations also appears to be strong. The authors examine state debt levels and borrowing costs over a six‐year period (2001–2006) and find little evidence of such an effect, despite rapidly growing debt burdens. Those concerned about state debt levels, the authors say, must look to sources other than investors for pressure to reduce debt issuance.     

Litigation, experimentation, and reputation

This paper develops a multiple-plaintiff game with a correlation across plaintiffs' private information (damage levels). It argues that the defendant engages in experimentation to learn (or remain uninformed about) the plaintiffs' types and play tougher (or softer) in the initial case when another party may also have an interest in the suit.