Students’ Personal Belief in a Just World,Well-Being,and Academic Cheating: A Cross-National Study

Social Justice Research - A cross-national study with university students from Germany (n?=?1135) and Turkey (n?=?634) tested whether personal belief in a just world (PBJW)...     

Why do military dictatorships become presidential democracies? Mapping the democratic interests of autocratic regimes

Public Choice - Recent data show that virtually all military dictatorships that democratize become presidential democracies. I hypothesize that the reason is that military interests are able to...     

Effects of Insurance on Child Labour: Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Behavioural Changes

In this paper we analyse possible effects of insurance on child labour. First, we develop a theoretical model that separates effects of insurance with and without a shock taking place. We then empirically test the hypotheses derived from the model by analysing the extension of a health insurance product in urban Hyderabad in Pakistan. Consistent with the theoretical model we develop in this paper, the reduction in child labour caused by the extension is largely due to an ex-ante feeling of protection as opposed to an ex-post shock-mitigation effect.     

Controlling Corruption in the Public Sector

Much of the literature on political corruption is based on indices such as the ones presented by Transparency International, but the reliability and validity of these indices are questionable. The main alternative approach – qualitative case studies – often lacks a theoretical framework allowing for systematic empirical analysis. To remedy this shortcoming, this article places qualitative case studies into the framework of principal-agent theory. The cases comprise two Swedish county councils (regional governments), both of which reorganised their administrations in similar ways in the 1990s. One experienced corruption scandals, but the other did not. In comparing them, the article links the propensity for corruption to institutional design – in particular, the mechanisms of delegation and control.     

Dual Identity Development and Adjustment in Muslim Minority Adolescents

Journal of Youth and Adolescence - Dual identity (e.g., strong ethnic and national identity) is a psychological resource for minority groups, but how it develops during adolescence is less clear....     

David and Goliath in the poll booth: group size,political power and voter turnout

ABSTRACT

This article analyses how the presence of a dominant group of voters within the electorate affects voter turnout. Theoretically, we argue that its absolute size affects turnout via increased free-riding incentives and reduced social pressure to vote within a larger dominant group. Its relative size compared to other groups within the electorate influences turnout through instrumental and expressive responses – in both the dominant and dominated groups – to the degree of electoral competition between groups. Empirical evidence from a large cross section of German municipalities is in line with these theoretical predictions. The observed effects should be taken into account when redesigning electoral jurisdictions through, for instance, municipal mergers or gerrymandering.     

Intra-Campaign Changes in Voting Preferences: The Impact of Media and Party Communication

An increasing number of citizens change and adapt their party preferences during the electoral campaign. We analyze which short-term factors explain intra-campaign changes in voting preferences, focusing on the visibility and tone of news media reporting and party canvassing. Our analyses rely on an integrative data approach, linking data from media content analysis to public opinion data. This enables us to investigate the relative impact of news media reporting as well as party communication. Inherently, we overcome previously identified methodological problems in the study of communication effects on voting behavior. Our findings reveal that campaigns matter: Especially interpersonal party canvassing increases voters’ likelihood to change their voting preferences in favor of the respective party, whereas media effects are limited to quality news outlets and depend on individual voters’ party ambivalence.