Die Rückkehr des befehlenden Staates? Muster und Ursachen der Veränderung staatlicher Handlungsformen in der deutschen Abfallpolitik

During the last 15 years, a shift in the relationship between state and society has been identified that can be characterized by an overall “retreat of the state”. The increasing use of co-operative policy instruments that do both, supplement and replace traditional authoritative measures, is one of the relevant manifestations of this change. However, most recent developments in German environmental policy in general and product-related waste management policy in particular reveal that this is all but an unambiguous tendency. After years of predominantly co-operative policy-approaches, there seems to be a revival of the authoritative state. The article analyses the patterns of change and presents reasons. In doing so, it challenges the popular functionalist hypothesis assuming that co-operative approaches arise from the functional needs of modern policy problems. Quite the contrary, the article draws on institutional factors — the European law in particular — and on party politics for explaining the identified change.     

Sustainable governance of natural resources and institutional change–an analytical framework

This article presents a conceptual framework for analysing the governance of natural resource use, as governance is often the primary issue when natural resources are overexploited and degraded. It addresses both spontaneous and active governance, including institutional change induced by development co‐operation. Drawing on existing frameworks of institutional analysis, fundamental modifications are presented to adapt the concept to the context of international co‐operation, and to include dynamic aspects of institutional change as well as multiple actor interactions. Tested in several case studies, the framework was found suitable and relevant for use in project planning and evaluation, as well as for comparing governance issues across cases in a conceptually rigorous way. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Verschafft die direkte Demokratie den Benachteiligten mehr Gehör? Der Einfluss institutioneller Rahmenbedingungen auf die mediale Präsenz politischer Akteure

Dieser Aufsatz untersucht den Einfluss politisch‐institutioneller Kontextfaktoren auf die Artikulationschancen politischer Akteure in der Öffentlichkeit. Als empirische Grundlage dient eine Inhaltsanalyse der Schwangerschaftsabbruchdebatte in der Schweiz im Vergleich mit Deutschland und den USA über einen Zeitraum von drei Jahrzehnten. Es wird aufgezeigt, dass institutionell bedingte Machtdifferentiale ‐ vermittelt über mediale Selektionslogiken ‐ in hohem Masse die öffentliche Präsenz der Akteure, ihr mediales Standing, bestimmen. Dies benachteiligt insbesondere zivilgesellschaftliche Herausforderer, wie etwa soziale Bewegungen. Direktdemokratische Verfahren, so wird weiter argumentiert, wirken in der Schweiz diesem Effekt jedoch entgegen, indem sie den Aussenseitern Möglichkeiten zur Profilierung und Etablierung bieten. Davon profitieren ebenfalls die Parteien, welchen in der Schweiz ansonsten eine schwache institutionelle Stellung attestiert wird. Mit seinen Ergebnissen stützt der Aufsatz schliesslich die Forderung nach einer Kontextualisierung politischer Kommunikationsforschung im Sinne eines “institutional turn” und zeigt das Potenzial einer komparativen Vorgehensweise auf.     

Healthy and maladjusted Type A behavior in adolescents

The dimensions of Type A behavior were studied in 990 randomly selected adolescents and their conceptualization was clarified in terms of achievement striving, self-concept, and sense of control. The methods used were the AFMS to evaluate Type A behavior, the Nowicki-Strickland Locus of Control Scale, and Coopersmith's Self-Esteem Inventory. Achievement striving was assessed using the questionnaire designed for this study. It was revealed that Type A consisted of two independent dimensions, both adding an equal contribution to the total score. One was an impatient, aggressive competitiveness related to a low self-esteem, low self-set achievement standards, and external locus of control. The other Type A exhibited competitiveness related to a sense of responsibility, leadership, social activity, high achievement striving, and high self-esteem. These factors may distinguish maladjusted competitiveness from healthy ambition and suggest that it is important to distinguish risk Type A individuals from Type A's who are potential leaders in society.Received Ph.D. in Psychology from the University of Helsinki, Finland. Her major research interest is psychosomatic medicine.     

To fight or not to fight?

Public Choice - This paper considers the players' behaviour in an asymmetric two-player contest. When do they decide to “struggle” and when to “subjugate”? Analysing...     

Precedence,privilege, preferences,plus Pareto principle: Some examples on egalitarian ethics and economic efficiency

It is demonstrated how economic theory of justice as fairness, Pareto improvements on situations involving equity, can be used to analyze the ethics contents of distributions of rights and privileges. The analysis makes use of the concept of a veil of ignorance to define a status quo. A property right to an ability or a privilege is interpreted as a transparency in the veil in respect to this ability or privilege. Three different examples are investigated, focusing on rights as collective goods, non-transferable abilities, and privileges as inherent rights.Revised version of Presidential address to the annual meeting of the European Public-Choice Society in Linz, Austria, 29 March to 1 April, 1989. I thank Johann K. Brunner, Josef Falkinger, and Björn Sandvik for many helpful comments.     

The Priorities of Materialist and Post-Materialist Values in the Nordic Countries - a Five-Nation Comparison

The present study takes the theory of post-materialism as a point of departure and compares the priorities of materialist and post-materialist values in the five Nordic countries (Denmark. Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden). The prevalence of political values in different countries is also examined, as is the relationship between materialist and post-materialist values and age, from the perspective of whether generational replacement will contribute to the spread of post-materialist values in the Nordic setting. Post-materialist values are given relatively strong emphasis in the Nordic countries because the mass publics are less concerned with economic security values than those in other Western democracies. The priorities of political values have remained relatively stable at the aggregate level from the late 1970s to 1987, although there has been a slight tendency for the mass publics to become more materialist. In all countries the post-war generations are more likely to support post-materialist values than the older generations. The correlations between age and political values have become somewhat smaller over the last 6–12 years.     

The state of nature in the shadow of contract formation: Adding a missing link to J.M. Buchanan's social contract theory

The social contract theory of J.M. Buchanan provides no clear-cut answer on the question which one of the multitude of possible Pareto-efficient contracts is chosen by individuals who shape a contract in an (imaginary) state of nature. This deficiency is remedied in this paper by adding the Nash-bargaining theory. It seems to be in line with at least part of Buchanan's reasoning. Whereas for Buchanan the configuration of contract depends unilaterally on the natural equilibrium of the state of nature, we are able to show that the parties' (rational) contractual expectations have repercussions for their behavior in the state of nature. That is why the location of the natural equilibrium proves to be heavily dependent on the chosen bargaining theory. The implication is that assessing the legitimacy of a given constitutional order or contract (on the basis of the natural equilibrium) depends on the particular bargaining theory chosen to solve the underlying constitutional distribution problem. I am grateful to D. Andrews, D. Schmidtchen and U. Witt for helpful comments on earlier drafts. The usual caveat applies.