Besprechungen

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Organisierte Interessen in der Landespolitik. Die Entstehung des INGE-Gesetzes in Hessen

In this case study we want to reduce the gap in research on the influence of organized interests at the federal state level. We analyse the “Gesetz zur Stärkung von innerstädtischen Geschäftsquartieren” (INGE) by applying social network analysis and statistical models. First, we show that the set of actors changes compared to the federal level. Second, we find that striving for influence pays off for non-state actors because influential actors find themselves close to the law. Third, we explain the degree of the actors’ influence. An OLS-regression shows that formal resources like governmental power as well as informal resources such as expertise and support increase influence. The use of informal resources is reflected in interactions in communication networks and specific network positions. Furthermore, we discuss this specific process of interaction between state and societal actors from the point of view of democratic theory.     

Generalisierung von Beschäftigungsrisiken oder anhaltende Arbeitsmarktsegmentation?

The article inquires whether segmentation concepts might shed a new light on the debates about the generalization of employment risks in Germany and develops the concept of firm employment sub-systems. The result of our empirical analyses is that the German labour market structure is shifting from a hegemony of Internal Labour Markets to a tense and instable co-existence of Internal and External markets, with East Germany having taken the lead. There is neither a generalisation of risks nor a stable division of employment. We rather observe dynamic segmentation with shifts between Internal and External Markets and endogenous transformations within segments.     

Abschied vom Interventionsstaat? Der Wandel staatlicher Subventionsausgaben in den OECD‐Ländern seit 1980

Der Aufsatz untersucht den Wandel der Subventionsausgaben der OECD‐Länder in den vergangenen 25 Jahren. Diese Ausgaben sind einerseits in fast allen Staaten der OECD‐Welt erheblich zurückgegangen, andererseits kam es zu einer starken Angleichung der Ausgabenniveaus. Die Analyse der Determinanten der nationalen Ausgabenniveaus und ihrer Veränderung zeigt einen Status quo‐Bias eines hohen institutionellen Pluralismus, während Parteien‐ und Interessengruppeneffekte seit den 1990er Jahren an Bedeutung verlieren. Sozioökonomische Problemlagen tragen ebenfalls nur in begrenztem Umfang zur Erklärung der internationalen Differenzen der Subventionsausgaben bei. Ebenso können die Europäische Integration und die Globalisierung für den Niedergang staatlicher Subventionsausgaben nicht unmittelbar verantwortlich gemacht werden.     

Föderalismus und Wohlfahrtsstaat im historischen Kontext: Der Fall Kanada

Federalism and the welfare state in Canada have always been mutually reinforcing. The pattern of welfare state development, however, has never followed a single narrow historical path since the critical juncture of confederation in 1867. It has instead been shaped by two conflicting approaches: a pan-Canadian approach and a province-based approach to the welfare state. An institutional configuration in accordance with the interstate model of federalism has enabled Ottawa and the provinces to initiate, restructure and recalibrate social policies, predominantly by voluntary negotiations but also by unilateral federal and provincial action. Efforts to reform the welfare state have been at the public policy level and also aimed at the institutional framework in which public policies are embedded. The interplay of such institutional features as policy pre-emption by the provinces and evolution of the federal spending power alongside a dual tax structure on the revenue side has promoted a dynamic which can hardly be captured by a narrow conception of path dependency.     

The village institutes experience in Turkey

This paper sheds light on the Village Institutes experience in Turkey from the late 1930s to the mid‐1940s. The Institutes have given rise to many academic and political controversies, and have remained an issue of confusion. This was owing partly to the lack of understanding of the real nature of the growing interest by the Kemalist elite in rural issues in the 1930s, and partly to the way that the power and importance of peasantist ideology had been underestimated, especially as it had gained wide currency amongst the governing elite in the 1930s and 1940s. This article begins by analyzing the historical and intellectual context of the period, and moves on to the development of the concept of the Village Institutes, assessing its most important and controversial characteristics. Finally, a new theoretical interpretation is offered within a critique of existing, widely‐held explanations that have dominated the theoretical literature on the issue for so long.     

Manipulation and strategic voting in the Norwegian parliament

The Norwegian parliament uses a sequential voting procedure. After some general remarks on how the legislature can avoid strategic voting by choosing an appropriate voting order, and an exposition of the rules whereby the agenda is determined in this particular parliament, voting order manipulation is examined. A manipulative actor tries to bring about voting sequences in accordance with his interests, but contrary to the putative will of other actors. An example illustrates how manipulation may take place in practice, but it is stressed that the realm of manipulation easily escapes empirical analysis. To grasp the different types of manipulation in legislative voting, models are needed that are rich in institutional detail.