Collaboration Processes and Institutional Structure: Reexamining the Black Box

Building on previous models of collaboration processes, this article expands and revises the antecedent-process-outcome framework used to explain collaboration. The article discusses why this framework needs to be expanded to include the element of institutional structure. We propose a modified framework to explain collaboration that includes a typology of citizen-based, agency-based, and mixed partnerships. Furthermore, the article draws from the expansive body of literature on watershed collaboration to propose additional antecedents that influence institutional structures and, in turn, alter the process patterns in the collaboration “black box.”     

Testing for food market integration revisited

This article considers the statistical performance of four commonly used econometric tests for market integration: the Law of One Price, the Ravallion Model, cointegration and Granger causality. A spatial price equilibrium (SPE) model, that is subject to both production shocks and general price inflation, and mimics many of the key characteristics of integrated food markets, is constructed. The model is used to generate food price time series of lengths that are typical of the short sample sizes available in most developing countries, for both instantaneously integrated and independent markets. A series of Monte Carlo experiments on these artificial food price time series are performed, which show that all four of the conventional tests for market integration are statistically flawed.     

Corruption and the Mexican political system: Continuity and change

Thanks to the nature of its political system, Mexico has had a long history of political corruption. Yet recent changes in the patterns of corruption and broader political changes have seemingly altered the equation. Anger over rampant corruption under President Carlos Salinas contributed to the stunning electoral defeat of the PRI in July 1997, while the outcome, the PRI's loss of majority control of the Chamber of Deputies, will add to the structural pressures that have mounted in recent years against institutionalised corruption. This article explores these trends. It sets out the historical and theoretical foundations of corruption in Mexico, examines changes in the incidence and patterns of corruption, and discusses the impact of recent political changes on this aspect of the system. Though cautiously optimistic regarding the impact of Mexico's political breakthrough on efforts to deal with the problem of corruption, the essay concludes on a cautious note, highlighting the difficulties other Latin American countries have encountered in strengthening the rule of law and reining in corruption.