Changes in labour power on district and county councils: Regional patterns and policy consequences

The focus of this article is on the quality and nature of local authority leadership. Local government leadership is male-dominated and appears to be stuck in a mould that is associated with orthodox male views that emphasise operational management rather than transformational leadership. The study shows that traditional views of leadership prevail among elected members, but such views are thought to run counter to the new approaches required for modernisation. As a result it is likely that the types of leadership and skills that are needed to transform local authorities are under-utilised. The study concludes by calling for the development of new models of leadership which capitalise on the talents of both men and women.     

Plans, performance information and accountability: the case of Best Value

The current UK government emphasizes the importance of mechanisms of accountability that involve the planning and public reporting of performance. One example of this is the Best Value performance plan. However, there has been little evaluation of the quality of the information provided in this type of document. This paper draws on literature on stakeholding and user needs to identify the data required for accountability. It then assesses whether the plans produced by Best Value pilot authorities in Wales provide appropriate information. The analysis shows that very few of the plans contained the relevant material. Interviews in the pilot authorities highlighted two key reasons for the poor level of data: a lack of performance indicators prior to Best Value and limited staff expertise in performance measurement. The evidence suggests that documents such as performance plans currently make little contribution to the accountability of public organizations.     

Assessing Organizational Performance: Exploring Differences Between Internal and External Measures

ABSTRACT

Differences in judgments of public service performance across stakeholder groups have often been noted, but have rarely been tested. We measure the extent of these differences between and within internal and external stakeholders. The evidence shows that internal groups usually overestimate the performance of their organizations. We then develop and test a model of inter-organizational variations in the extent of this overestimation. The statistical results show that performance overestimation is more likely in small organizations with geographically dispersed clients, and in organizations that adopt fashionable management practices that are associated with higher institutional legitimacy.     

Competitive Tendering In Local Government: A Review Of Theory And Evidence

The introduction of compulsory competitive tendering in UK local government reflected conventional public choice theories of bureaucracy. These theories suggest that competition for service contracts will lead to lower expenditure and higher efficiency. Extensions and criticisms of the classical public choice model yield very different conclusions. First, the problems of bureaucratic supply are less severe than originally assumed, and secondly competition may itself generate new problems such as transaction costs, erosion of trust between principals and agents, and rent seeking. The impact of competition on spending and efficiency is therefore indeterminate, and must be established empirically. However, studies which evaluate the effects of competitive tendering in local government are few in number, cover a limited range of services, and are methodologically flawed. Therefore neither the initial imposition of competitive tendering by the Conservatives, nor its planned abolition by Labour, can be traced to a solid foundation of theoretical or empirical support. Theoretical and methodological problems that need to be resolved by further empirical studies are identified.     

Median voters,political systems and public policies: An empirical test

This paper tests the median voter hypothesis that variations in policies across political systems are caused by variations in median voter preferences. The context of the empirical analysis is the tax policies of three groups of sub-national governments in England in three time periods. The results of a median voter model of tax policy variation are compared to the results of a mean voter model in different party systems and different electoral systems. The evidence provides little support for the median voter hypothesis.     

What Explains Agency Heads’ Length of Tenure? Testing Managerial Background,Performance, and Political Environment Effects

There are a number of influences on how long an agency head serves. The importance of particular influences, in turn, depends on the prospective destination of the agency head: elsewhere in the public sector, the private sector, or retirement. The authors estimate survival models of agency heads’ tenure using panel data on British central government executive agencies from 1989 to 2012. Findings suggest that chief executives of poorly performing agencies are encouraged to retire sooner. There is no evidence that a change in political control increases the risk of any form of exit, suggesting that political pressure to leave is not substantial for this type of official. Outsiders—agency heads recruited from outside central government—are relatively difficult to retain for a longer time, such that potential shortfalls in suitable managers caused by retirements in an aging workforce may be difficult to make up by appointing from this source.