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11.
Does the introduction of proportionality in electoral systems help to boost popular evaluations of democracy? This article takes advantage of an electoral reform in Lesotho to conduct a natural experiment. We trace shifts over time in popular political support, using Afrobarometer data collected before and after reform to measure mass satisfaction with democracy and public trust in political institutions. We find both direct and indirect effects. In the aggregate, Lesotho's transition from a majoritarian to a mixed electoral system is directly associated with increased levels of citizen support for the country's state and regime. Importantly, however, formal institutions have only indirect effects at the individual level, where a person's informal partisan status – as a member of a winning majority or losing minority – mediates the impacts of institutional change.  相似文献   
12.
In May 2005, the government of Zimbabwe launched Operation Murambatsvina(OM), a state-sponsored campaign to stifle independent economicand political activity in the country’s urban areas. Thisarticle employs a national probability sample survey to analysethe popular reactions of ordinary Zimbabweans to this landmarkevent. It shows that the application of state repression succeedsat some goals, fails at others, and has powerful unintendedeffects. We report that the scope of OM was wide and that themain victims of OM were younger, unemployed families whom statesecurity agents saw as potential recruits for social unrest.Whereas OM undoubtedly disrupted the informal economy, we showthat it did not succeed in banishing urban dwellers to ruralareas or permanently shutting down illicit trade. Moreover,the crackdown thoroughly discredited the police and other stateinstitutions. We also demonstrate that state repression emboldenedits victims, deepening polarisation between political partiesand fortifying the ranks of Zimbabwe’s opposition movement. 1. Disturbing accounts of the human toll are given by the CatholicCommission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, Breaking the Silence,Building True Peace: A report on the disturbances in Matabelelandand the Midlands, 1980 to 1988 (Legal Resources Foundation,Harare, 1997) and Richard Werbner, Tears of the Dead (EdinburghUniversity Press, Edinburgh, 1991). On systematic electoralviolence, see Norma Kriger, ‘ZANU-PF strategies in generalelections, 1980–2000: discourse and coercion’, AfricanAffairs 104 (2005), pp. 1–34. On the violence associatedwith land invasions and crackdowns on journalists, see StephenChan, Robert Mugabe: A life of power and violence (I.B. Taurus,London, 2003) and Andrew Meldrum, Where We Have Hope: A memoirof Zimbabwe (Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, 2004). 2. For an insightful collection of current analyses by a varietyof Zimbabwean commentators, see David Harold-Berry (ed.), Zimbabwe:The past is the future (Weaver Press, Harare, 2004). 3. ‘Zimbabwe police target minibuses’, BBC News, 24May 2005. 4. The Joint Operations Command - comprised of army, police, prisons,and intelligence heads - coordinates military and security affairsand, on these matters, now carries greater policy weight thanthe civilian cabinet. A senior state intelligence officer wasquoted as saying that ‘the operation is meant to reducethe number of people in the central business district so that,if violence erupts, it would be easy to contain.’ ZimOnline (South Africa) www.zimonline.co.za, 24 May 2005. JournalistBaffour Ankomah, usually sympathetic to Mugabe, also reportedthat ‘the operation was the brainchild of Zimbabwe’sintelligence community’ designed to forestall ‘aUkrainian-style revolution’ New African (London), October2005, reprinted in The Herald (Harare), 4–5 October 2005. 5. Government of Zimbabwe, ‘Response of the Government ofZimbabwe to the Report by the UN Special Envoy on OperationMurambatsvina/Restore Order’ (Harare, 2005). 6. ‘Rallying cry belies Mugabe’s fear of voter revolt’,The Times (UK), 31 March 2005. 7. Compared to the 2000 parliamentary election, ZANU-PF’sshare of elected seats rose from 62 to 78, and the MDC’sshare fell from 57 to 41. With the support of an additional30 appointed MPs in the 150-seat House, ZANU-PF therefore enjoyeda two-thirds majority, enough to change the constitution. 8. Zimbabwe Election Support Network, ‘Statement on the 2005parliamentary elections’, Harare, 3 April 2005. See alsoCarole Andrews and Bryn Morgan, ‘Zimbabwe after the 2005parliamentary elections’, Research Paper No. 05/58 (UKHouse of Commons Library, London, August 2005). 9. ‘Police in Zimbabwe arrest 9000 traders’, Guardian(UK), 24 May 2005. 10. ‘Zimbabwe government continues blitz’, AssociatedPress, 5 June 2005. 11. ‘U.N. condemns Zimbabwe for bulldozing urban slums,’New York Times, 23 July 2005. 12. United Nations, Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabweto Assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina bythe UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe,Mrs. Anna Tibaijuka (United Nations, New York, 18 July 2005),p. 7. 13. ‘UN chief Annan’s statement on Zimbabwe demolitions’,Reuters, 22 July 2005. 14. ‘Zimbabwe steams ahead with demolitions’, Mail andGuardian (SA), 26 July 2005. 15. See ‘UN envoy says Zimbabwe’s crisis is deepening’,Business Day (SA), 7 December 2005 and ‘New threat ofurban demolition’, IRIN - Integrated Regional InformationNetworks (UN), 7 April 2006. 16. For information on country coverage and research methods, seewww.afrobarometer.org. 17. The sampling frame was the Government of Zimbabwe, Central StatisticalOffice, Census 2000 Zimbabwe: Preliminary results summary (GovernmentPrinter, Harare, 2003). In drawing the national probabilitysample, we followed the standard Afrobarometer sampling protocol,which can be found at http://www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.html.For ease of access to the present article, we did not burdenthe text with extensive methodological apparatus. If readershave queries about data collection or analysis, they are invitedto visit the website or contact the authors directly. 18. ‘Zimbabwe takes harsh steps in major cities to counterunrest’, New York Times, 2 June 2005. 19. Action Aid International/Combined Harare Residents Association,A Study on the Impact of ‘Operation/Murambatsvina/RestoreOrder’ in 26 Wards of Harare High Density Housing Areas(AA/CHRA, Harare, July 2005). 20. Report of the Fact-Finding Mission (2005), p. 8. 21. Ibid., p. 34. 22. ‘Annan may take up Mugabe invite’, The Scotsman(UK), 26 July 2005. 23. ‘Mugabe hoping to sidestep Mbeki and Annan’, SundayIndependent (SA), 24 July 2005. Zimbabwe’s Ambassadorto the UN also branded the report ‘exaggerated’,BBC News, 27 July 2005. 24. The margin of sampling error for a survey with 1048 respondentsis plus or minus 3 percentage points at a 95 percent level ofconfidence. The confidence interval around the point estimateof 54 percent for OM victimization is therefore between 51 and57 percent. This result almost exactly replicates the findingof an earlier survey conducted by the Mass Public Opinion Institute.Based on a national probability sample of similar size (n =1041) and using the same question, MPOI found in July-August2005 that 55 percent of respondents reported that they or theirimmediate families were affected. See Eldred Masunungure andAnyway Ndapadzwa, Zimbabwe Elections, 2005: Post-Parliamentarysurvey report (MPOI, Harare, August 2005). 25. Census 2002, p.1. 26. This guesstimate is conservative compared to the Reserve Bankof Zimbabwe’s claim of 3.4 million Zimbabweans livingabroad in 2004 (www.homelinkzimbabwe.com) and various journalisticaccounts of 3 million or more, for example by Geoff Hill, WhatHappens After Mugabe? (Zebra Press, Cape Town, 2005), p. 2. 27. The World Bank’s African Development Indicators says 43percent are under age 14 (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2004),p. 309. 28. Or, taking sampling error into account, between 2.55 and 2.85million. 29. Survey respondents may have used an especially broad subjectivedefinition when defining an OM victim as a member of their ‘immediatefamily’. There is also a small risk that some victimswere double-counted as members of more than one respondent’sextended family. Either way, we doubt that we have undercounted. 30. Squatter settlements were unapproved, but many of them had existingcourt judgments that prevented the government from removingthem without providing alternative accommodation. Some shacksin urban areas even had planning permission. 31. ‘Msika officially launches operation Garikai’, TheHerald (Harare), 30 June 2005. Also ‘Zimbabwe: operationlive well struggles to take off’, IRIN - Integrated RegionalInformation Networks (UN), 19 August 2005. 32. In Zimbabwe, as in other African countries, young and unemployedpeople are least likely to vote. 33. Mass Public Opinion Institute, Zimbabwe Elections, 2005 (MPOI,Harare, 2005) p. iii. 34. Note: the percentage figures should be treated with cautionas the number of cases is small (n = 56). 35. Sixty percent of these respondents were urban versus 34 percentrural. 36. 35 percent among the former versus 37 percent among the latter. 37. 41 percent among the random sample of adults, 45 percent amongdisplaced persons. 38. For 2004 estimates of institutional trust, see Michael Bratton,Annie Chikwana, and Tulani Sithole, ‘Propaganda and publicopinion in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Contemporary AfricanStudies 23, 1 (2005), pp. 77–108. 39. According to an official report, ‘Police had been approachedby local authorities to help in enforcing Council by-laws, whichwere being ignored . . . (and) to relocate street kids, vagrants,touts and vendors who were causing chaos in town.’ ZimbabweRepublic Police, ‘Zimbabwe Republic Police response toallegations of deaths suffered during Operation Murambatsvina/RestoreOrder’, (Harare, August 2005). 40. This slight adjustment lies within the margin of sampling errorfor a single survey. 41. Pearson’s r = 0.271, p < 0.001. 42. By 9 percentage points: 71 percent for OM victims versus 80percent for non-victims. 43. ‘Price of basics soars beyond reach of poor Zimbabweans’,Mail and Guardian (South Africa), 20 March 2006. 44. Pearson’s r = 0.962, p < 0.001. Indeed, these indicatorsare so closely correlated that either could act as a proxy forthe other. 45. The proportion of MDC supporters who said they did not trustthe ruling party ‘at all’ rose from 49 percent inApril 2004 to 62 percent in October 2005. 46. Although the results of the bye-election of May 2006 in Budirirosuggest the mainstream MDC headed by Morgan Tsvangirai has littleto fear from the breakaway MDC faction led by Arthur Mutambara. 47. See International Crisis Group, ‘Post-election Zimbabwe:What next?’ Africa Report No. 93 http://www.crisisgroup.org(7 June, 2005). 48. Eldred, Masunungure, Anyway Ndapwadza, and Noma Sibanda, ‘Supportfor democracy and democratic institutions in Zimbabwe’,Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 27 http://www.afrobarometer.org(March 2006). 49. International Crisis Group, ‘Zimbabwe’s operationMurambatsvina: the tipping point?’ Africa Report No. 97,p. 4 http://www.crisisgroup.org (17 August, 2005). 50. ‘African leaders break silence over Mugabe’s humanrights abuses’, The Guardian (UK), 4 January 2006.  相似文献   
13.
Theoretical and empirical consideration has long been given to the role of subcultural attitudes and how they relate to delinquency and crime. Recently, Anderson has reconceptualized these early attitudinal depictions by considering the formation and role of these specific attitudes or ‘code of the street’ among African-Americans in inner-city neighborhoods. A number of important findings have emerged from this literature, yet much remains to be considered. We contribute to this literature in three specific ways by examining: (1) the scope of street code attitudes across a wide variety of individuals—and not just inner-city African American (males) to assess the generalizability of these attitudes; (2) the correlates of street code attitudes; and (3) the extent to which street code attitudes mediate the relationship between various demographic and attitudinal (self-control) variables and crime. Theoretical implications and directions for future research are addressed.  相似文献   
14.
15.
Deterrence lies at the heart of the criminal justice system and policy. There is a lack of information on citizen??s perceptions regarding a critical element of the deterrence process as it manifests through the communication of sanction threats. This study uses data from over 400 adults to examine their knowledge regarding the probability of detection and the average punishments for DUI, and also assesses the contribution of demographic and theoretical variables in predicting perceptions of detection probabilities and punishment estimates. Results show that persons over-estimate the likelihood of detection and provide higher estimates for average sentence lengths, but very few variables predict deterrence perceptions. An investigation of the resetting effect shows that persons tend to lower the estimated likelihood of punishment after experiencing a punishment. Deterrence may work better if researchers and policy officials understand what influences these perceptions and how they may be modified.  相似文献   
16.
Credit programmes aimed at individual smallholders in Africa have had disappointing results, particularly with regard to loan repayment. This article enquires whether group lending under terms of joint liability is a more effective approach. Data are derived from the performance of smallholder credit schemes in Zimbabwe in the period 1980–1984. The findings are as follows: (a) access to credit is easier for small farmers if they belong to voluntary agricultural associations; (b) loans issued on terms of joint liability have lower administrative costs; (c) most importantly, joint liability arrangements lead to higher repayment rates than schemes based on individual liability; (d) although joint liability is better enforced by mandatory sanction than by selective incentive, this advantage is offset by a disintegrative effect on farmer organizations. The conclusion is that a policy of group lending is generally more viable than an individual approach, but only in the context of the creation and strengthening of local farmer institutions.  相似文献   
17.
Many scholars have suggested that Americans' positions on gun control are the product of culture conflicts. This assertion has been largely based on associations of gun control opinion with membership in social groups believed to be hostile, or favorable, towards gun ownership, rather than with direct measures of the cultural traits thought to mediate the effects of group membership on gun control opinion. Data from a 2005 national telephone survey were analyzed to test competing theories of why people support handgun bans. Instrumental explanations, which stress belief in a policy's likely effectiveness, accounted for less than 25 percent of the variation in support. The results supported the culture conflict perspective. Those who endorsed negative stereotypes about gun owners, and who did not believe in the need to defend their own homes against crime (versus relying on the police) were more likely to support handgun bans.  相似文献   
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