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231.
This paper proposes a model for explaining shifts and variations in U.S. grand strategy. The model is based on a distinction between four ideal-type grand strategies or ideational approaches to security according to the objectives and means of security policy: defensive and offensive realism, and defensive and offensive liberalism. While the four approaches are continually present in the U.S. policy community, it is the combination of two systemic conditions—namely the distribution of capabilities and the balance of threat—that selects among the competing approaches and determines which grand strategy is likely to emerge as dominant in a given period. Great power parity is conducive to realist approaches. In contrast, a situation of hegemony encourages the emergence of ideological grand strategies, which focus on ideology promotion, according to the ideology of the hegemon. In the case of a liberal hegemon, such as the United States, liberal approaches are likely to emerge as dominant. In addition, a relative absence of external threat encourages defensive approaches, while a situation of high external threat gives rise to offensive strategies. Thus, various combinations of these systemic factors give rise to the emergence of various grand strategies. This model is tested in two cases of the two most recent shifts in U.S. grand strategy following 1991. In accordance with the expectations of the model, a change in the distribution of capabilities with the end of the Cold War made possible a change from realist to liberal strategies. In the benign environment of the 1990s the dominant strategy was defensive liberalism, while the change in the balance of threat after 9/11 gave rise to the grand strategy of offensive liberalism.  相似文献   
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Abstract

This paper explores how offender profiles might influence the way in which individuals interpret investigative information dependent on its congruence with the investigators’ own beliefs. Participants, comprising 222 lay people, completed an online questionnaire where a profile was either congruent or incongruent with a stereotypical or an atypical suspect who was presented before or after the introduction of the profile (resulting in eight conditions). Several cognitive strategies appeared to be used in interpreting the information. Contrary to expectations, individuals relying on representativeness heuristics were more influenced by a profile challenging their views than by one supporting them, whilst individuals who invested greater cognitive effort (termed hereafter “cognitive elaboration”) were more resistant to changing their views in light of disconfirming profiling advice. There was tentative evidence to suggest that a confirmation bias might occur when individuals engage in cognitive elaboration, such that individuals appeared to be more influenced by a confirming profile than by a disconfirming one. Finally, it was found that the profile was perceived to be more influential when presented before the introduction of a suspect than after. Implications for advising on the interpretation of such advice, as well as preparing such reports, are discussed.  相似文献   
233.
Older people constitute an important category of eyewitnesses. Episodic memory performance in older persons is poorer than in younger adults, but little research has been made on older persons’ metacognitive judgments. Since more persons of advanced age will likely be called upon as witnesses in coming years, it is critical to characterize this population’s metacognitive abilities. We compared event memory metacognition in old adults (66-year-old, n = 74) to very old adults (87 or 90 years old, n = 55). Participants were tested on their memory of a film, using questions with two answer alternatives and the confidence in their answer. As expected, the very old group had a lower accuracy rate than the old group (d = 0.59). The very old group, however, monitored this impairment, since their over-/underconfidence and calibration did not differ from the old group but they displayed a poorer ability to separate correct from incorrect answers (discrimination ability). Possibly, the very old group was able to monitor the level of their over-/underconfidence because they applied general self-knowledge about their memory skills. In contrast, the discrimination of correct from incorrect answers may be more dependent on ability to attend to the features of each retrieved memory.  相似文献   
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Abstract

Via an analysis of the trans-ASEAN gas pipeline project (TAGP), in this article we argue for a reconceptualising of the regional dynamics of Southeast Asia and the forces shaping them. For this task, we propose an analytical framework based upon social conflict theory that delves within and beyond the state, and which places emphasis upon the roles of both material and ideological factors operating across time in the reordering of particular geographical spaces. The framework reveals that the tensions acting within and upon ASEAN and the TAGP influence regionalism in such a way that the gas pipeline project – much like other ‘regional’ projects – is unlikely to ever come close to fulfilling its brief of enhancing regional security and cohesion. What is more probable is that the project's form will continue to be conditioned by entrenched politico-economic realities and the influence of dominant ideologies – factors which have the capacity to exacerbate existing regional animosities and disparities.  相似文献   
236.
This paper examines how changes in governmental and social influences affect environmental enforcement in Guangzhou city, China, between 2000 and 2006. The paper finds that a form of “decentered regulation” has developed. Regulatory enforcement is no longer the sole affair of the government and the regulatory bureaucracy, but has been increasingly influenced by societal forces. The transformation over time shows the promises and limits of decentered regulation in Guangzhou's dynamic authoritarian setting. Analyzing a set of longitudinal survey data and qualitative interviews, the paper finds that by 2006, the rise of civil society and its increased support for protecting the environment had a double‐edged impact on the enforcement of environmental regulations. The paper demonstrates that on the one hand, by 2006, when government support for enforcement was low, societal forces developed an ability to counterbalance such lack of governmental support and positively influence enforcement. However, it also shows that when government support was high, a concurrent rise in societal support created a negative effect on enforcement. Thus too much societal support can become an enforcement burden.  相似文献   
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