Responding to terrorism across the technological spectrum

The ‘revolution in military affairs’ arguably heralds a new era of warfare dominated by the American military's mastery of the conventional battlefield. This ‘revolution’, however, will have little if any impact on American military capabilities so far as countering terrorism, insurgency, or guerrilla warfare are concerned. With regard to terrorism specifically, a combination of the resurgence of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative and the implications that it has to trigger acts future of mass, indiscriminate violence; the proliferation of ‘amateur’ terrorist groups which may contribute to the loosening of previous self‐imposed constraints on operations and lethality, and the growing sophistication of established, more ‘professional’ groups is likely to lead to higher levels of lethality and destruction than in the past.     

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Framing Narratives and Prescriptions

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has positioned itself at the vanguard of a media revolution in which terrorist groups both create and frame news events to an unprecedented extent. Through the publication of its e-magazine Sada al-Malahim (The Echo of Epic Battles), the organization has sought to mobilize both Yemeni and non-Yemeni Muslim, Arabic-speaking audiences to carry out violent jihad. This article utilizes the concept of collective action frames to analyze Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's media output, identifying the organization's grievance narratives, ideological justifications for violent actions, and means to strengthen its credibility among its intended audiences.     

Creating stability in the New Europe: The OSCE high commissioner on national minorities and the socialization of risky states

In “Protecting ‘The Prize': Oil and the U.S. National Interest,” Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press present an important counterargument to many common but overwrought worries about energy security. Yet they themselves go too far in the opposite direction. Gholz and Press argue that only three types of potential oil market disruptions could induce “particularly painful” adjustments and hence rise to the highest level: consolidation of a large fraction of Persian Gulf reserves under a single power, domestic instability in Saudi Arabia, and blockage of the Strait of Hormuz. I argue in this response that Gholz and Press confine the second and third scenarios too narrowly, and hence understate the security risks stemming from U.S. dependence on oil.