Crisis Negotiation: A Counter-Intuitive Method to Disrupt Terrorism

The Crisis Negotiation Unit (CNU) method of negotiation as a response to international kidnapping disrupts criminal and terrorist operations alike. It combines crisis intervention, sound aggressive business negotiation, academic negotiation research, and hard earned experience into an aggressive effort to exploit the kidnappers. The cornerstone of this is that negotiation is not concession. The CNU method reduces the risk of harm to the victims, increases the chances of their safe release, and enhances the likelihood of a successful apprehension of the kidnappers.‐     

Performance pressure: Patterns of partisanship and the economic vote

Numerous studies have demonstrated a weakening identification of voters with political parties in Western Europe over the last three decades. It is argued here that the growing proportion of voters with weak or no party affinities has strong implications for economic voting. When the proportion of voters with partisan affinities is low, the effect of economic performance on election outcomes is strong; when partisans proliferate, economic conditions matter less. Employing Eurobarometer data for eight European countries from 1976 to 1992, this inverse association between partisanship and the economic vote is demonstrated. This finding implies a growing effect for the objective economy on the vote in Europe. It helps explain an important puzzle in the economic voting literature: Weak results in aggregate level cross‐national studies of economic voting may be attributable to characteristics of the electorate, not just to the characteristics of government.     

THE VICTIM–OFFENDER OVERLAP IN CONTEXT: EXAMINING THE ROLE OF NEIGHBORHOOD STREET CULTURE*

Although numerous studies have found a strong relationship between offending and victimization risk, the etiology of this relationship is not well understood. Largely absent from this research is an explicit focus on neighborhood processes. However, theoretical work found in the subculture of violence literature implies that neighborhood street culture may help to account for the etiology of this phenomenon. Specifically, we should expect the magnitude of the victim–offender overlap to vary closely with neighborhood‐based violent conduct norms. This research uses waves 1 and 2 of the Family and Community Health Study (FACHS) to test the empirical validity of these notions. Our results show that the victim–offender overlap is not generalizeable across neighborhood contexts; in fact, it is especially strong in neighborhoods where the street culture predominates, whereas it is significantly weaker in areas where this culture is less prominent. These results indicate that neighborhood‐level cultural processes help to explain the victim–offender overlap, and they may cause this phenomenon to be context specific.     

PRIVATIZING UK TAX LAW ENFORCEMENT?

Tax law enforcement in the UK has long been dominated by public bureaucracies of the 'classic' type. This article reviews some current problems of tax law enforcement in that style, and looks at some possible ways of mitigating those problems. These include a change in penalty schedules and some measure of 're-privatization' of tax law enforcement, harking back to pre-bureaucratic enforcement styles. Six problems likely to be associated with privatization of tax law enforcement are discussed. These are not trivial, but it is argued that they may be somewhat less severe in the case of tax law enforcement than in that of law enforcement in general.     

USING BUREAUCRACY SPARINGLY

'Using bureaucracy sparingly' (UBS) is a well-known and traditional canon of good public administration — but one that has a number of meanings which are not wholly compatible with one another. Looking at the interface between government administration and the outside public (rather than at the internal operations of government bureaux), this essay identifies three rather different senses of UBS, all of which are in common currency. The implications of two of these are then explored, in terms of the kinds of preferences they imply for the use of government's administrative instruments. Finally, there is a brief discussion of what the different senses of UBS have in common and of the extent to which they have divergent implications, posing dilemmas for those who might wish to 'use bureaucracy sparingly'.     

THE NEGLECTED SITUATION: A CROSSNATIONAL STUDY OF THE SITUATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIME*

Although it is generally recognized in the social sciences that the “situation” is indispensable for understanding behavior, thus far criminologists have not devoted systematic attention to situational analysis. This paper contributes to the development of a situational perspective on crime by defining the concept of situation, developing four hypotheses about the situational characteristics of selected personal contact crimes, and then testing those hypotheses using victimization survey data from the United States and Venezuela. The research shows that coercive crimes are less situationally clustered than noncoercive crimes and that instrumental crimes are more situationally clustered than character crimes. Despite tremendous differences in crime rates for the two countries, substantial similarity is found in situational crime patterns. The implications of the research for criminological theory are discussed.     

Erosion and Variety in Pay for High Public Office

Two elements have characterized the rewards for public officials in the past two decades. One is the erosion of pay and perquisites in many democratic countries. The other is a continuing variety of rewards, especially when compared to those in the private sector. Using data from a variety of OECD countries and the European Union, this article investigates alternative explanations for these two elements. The data is adjusted for purchasing power of the different currencies and then related to the relative wealth of the countries. We find that ideas, interests and institutions all have some explanatory power, but that none is sufficient by itself to explain either variety or erosion in pay across the range of countries. The policy implications of these findings, in terms of both “how” and “how much” public officials should be paid, are also examined.