Explaining the Incidence and Timing of Congressional Responses to the U.S. Supreme Court

Sparked by interest in game‐theoretic representations of the separation of powers, empirical work examining congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory decisions has burgeoned in recent years. Much of this work has been hampered, however, by the relative rarity of such events; as has long been noted, congressional attention to the Court is limited, and most Court decisions represent the last word on statutory interpretation. With this fact foremost in our minds, we examine empirically a number of theories regarding such reversals. By adopting an approach that allows us to separate the factors that lead to the event itself (that is, the presence or absence of an override in a particular case) from those that influence the timing of the event, we find that case‐specific factors are an important influence in the incidence of overrides, whereas Congress‐ and Court‐specific political influences dominate the timing at which those overrides occur. By separating the incidence and timing of overrides, our study yields a more accurate and nuanced understanding of this aspect of the separation‐of‐powers system.     

Agency Design as an Ongoing Tool of Bureaucratic Influence

Theoretical work assumes that legislators use ex ante design to gain bureaucratic influence, not only at an agency's appointment stage but also as an ongoing tactic. Yet no empirical work has investigated whether or not legislators prefer to use design to exert influence after an agency's appointment stage. Using a mail survey of more than 2,500 legislators, we model legislators' preferences for ex ante design as a function of both institutional factors and individual legislators' characteristics. Our results suggest that the feasibility of agency design as an ongoing tactic of bureaucratic influence is more limited than theoretical work indicates and that both institutional‐ and individual‐level factors explain legislators' preferences.     

The Deterrent Effects of Automobile Insurance and Tort Law: A Survey of the Empirical Literature

One of the central issues in the debate concerning no-fault insurance is the question of whether tort damages can deter accidents. Although a large, scientific literature exists which could cast light on this question, the participants in the debate have made little reference to that literature. In an attempt to rectify this omission, the following paper surveys a large segment of the statistical results, and comments on the implications which those results have for the no- fault debate.     

RISK,RACE, AND RECIDIVISM: PREDICTIVE BIAS AND DISPARATE IMPACT*

One way to unwind mass incarceration without compromising public safety is to use risk assessment instruments in sentencing and corrections. Although these instruments figure prominently in current reforms, critics argue that benefits in crime control will be offset by an adverse effect on racial minorities. Based on a sample of 34,794 federal offenders, we examine the relationships among race, risk assessment [the Post Conviction Risk Assessment (PCRA)], and future arrest. First, application of well‐established principles of psychological science revealed little evidence of test bias for the PCRA—the instrument strongly predicts arrest for both Black and White offenders, and a given score has essentially the same meaning—that is, the same probability of recidivism—across groups. Second, Black offenders obtain higher average PCRA scores than do White offenders (d = .34; 13.5 percent nonoverlap in groups’ scores), so some applications could create disparate impact. Third, most (66 percent) of the racial difference in PCRA scores is attributable to criminal history—which is already embedded in sentencing guidelines. Finally, criminal history is not a proxy for race, but instead it mediates the relationship between race and future arrest. Data are more helpful than rhetoric if the goal is to improve practice at this opportune moment in history.