HOW POLICY‐MAKERS (REALLY) UNDERSTAND GLOBALIZATION: THE INTERNAL ARCHITECTURE OF ANGLOPHONE GLOBALIZATION DISCOURSE IN EUROPE

There is a growing acceptance in the literature of a potentially significant causal role for ideas about globalization in shaping the trajectory of policy and institutional reform in contemporary Europe. Yet we still know remarkably little about policy‐makers' understandings of globalization, save those they choose to declare publicly. This paper contributes to the important task of operationalizing empirically this key set of ideational variables. Using factor analysis of new survey data collected by the authors it maps and compares UK and Irish policy‐maker's understandings of, and orientations towards, globalization. The analysis reveals considerable similarities in the ordering of assumptions and attitudes towards globalization between the two country cases and between civil servants and parliamentarians. Yet it also shows some subtle and intriguing differences between policy‐makers' responses in the UK and Ireland and between elected and unelected officials. Intriguingly, it also suggests a significant disparity between politicians' private understandings and public discourses of globalization, with the former less necessitarian in tone than the latter. Above all, it suggests that Anglophone globalization discourse in Europe is principally structured in terms of a number of dimensions which relate to the acceptance or rejection of a series of core neoliberal premises. In effect, the terms and internal architecture of globalization discourse in the UK and Ireland are defined by neoliberal assumptions, to the extent that they provide the core point of reference and orientation for even the most sceptical and critical of views.     

Making a difference: results of a pilot investigation into the impact of technical co-operation training on developing countries

This article reviews a recent innovation in the evaluation of training undertaken by the British Council on behalf of the Overseas Development Administration. It describes a pilot study carried out to assess the impact of training on personnel from a number of developing countries, six months after their return to work. The article explains briefly the context in which the exercise took place, and highlights its findings and implications for future work. First results, albeit from a limited sample, suggest positive benefits to the individual, the work group and their organization. Future analysis will in many cases be done overseas and will need to link more closely with overall project objectives to assess the impact of training. Evaluations will also need to take into account the increasing trend to supply training in-country or in a third country rather than the UK. They will also be able to check assumptions that the quality, cost and benefits to the project and host institutions are greater in these cases than for UK training.     

BUREAU SHUFFLING? THE REVIEW OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND

The Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement of 1998 resulted in the return of devolved government to Northern Ireland and, with it, a decision by the Executive and Assembly to conduct a radical review of public administration. The review is now reaching its final stages and this paper considers the likely outcomes. It both argues that the parameters of the review will limit its impact and describes the reform proposals as either structural changes or administrative rationalization, both devoid of a wider modernizing approach to improving public services. In Northern Ireland, the on/off nature of devolution could result in ‘one of the major tasks for devolved government’ (according to the Northern Ireland Executive) being implemented by Direct Rule ministers.     

BRITISH 'WAR CABINETS' IN LIMITED WARS: KOREA, SUEZ AND THE FALKLANDS

In crises leading to a limited war, the Cabinet assigns responsibility for its detailed management to a 'War Cabinet'. For Korea the standing Defence Committee was used; the Cabinet's role was effectively limited to parliamentary and public relations. Smaller, ad hoc committees were used in the Suez and Falklands crises. At times of greatest pressure the Cabinet in each case had the formal opportunity to take major decisions; but in practice, especially during Suez, this amounted to an opportunity for a veto which was unlikely to be used. Two dangers facing a War Cabinet are those of tunnel vision and of the undue influence of military or technical considerations. The full Cabinet, best suited in principle to relate the problems of the war to the Government's other problems and goals, risks finding itself flanked by a War Cabinet too close to the war and by a Parliament which is too far away and too excitable.     

THE PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS IN FEDERAL COURTS: 1980–1998*

Research Summary: This study reports findings from the American Terrorism Study. The data show that from 1980 to 1998, the U.S. government periodically tried accused domestic and international terrorists through the use of traditional criminal trials. The extent to which federal prosecutors “explicit politicized” these trials (and the success that the politicization had) varied among the types of terrorist groups. Explicit politically was not found to be successful in trials of domestic terrorists but seemed to work for trials involving international terrorists. Over the 20‐year period, however, federal prosecutors began to rely more heavily (and more successfully) on the politicization of the criminal acts by international terrorists. The results also show that international terrorists, like their domestic counterparts, are much less likely to plead guilty. Finally, the study shows that these traditional trials have resulted in international terrorists being punished more severely than domestic terrorists. Unfortunately, the practice of performing these politicized trials within the venue of the federal court system may have been compromised by defense strategies that capitalized on the due process procedures so prominent in the U.S. system of justice. In the wake of the terrorism attacks in September 2001 by foreign nationals, the federal government began to take the next step in its “war against terrorism” by instituting the use of military tribunals. Policy Implications: Although the federal government has been relatively successful in the prosecution of terrorism in America in the past two decades, the movement toward the use of military tribunals has perhaps become inevitable (as the use of the traditional criminal trial for international terrorists manifests weaknesses). In the short term, it is likely that several international terrorism cases stemming from the September 2001 attacks and other subsequent attacks (which may be presumed) will be tried in federal courthouses across the country (even with the advent of military tribunals). Federal prosecutors will need to be trained on the specifics of trying these kinds of cases. In the long term, the use of military tribunals will provide greater ease of prosecution for the federal government. Long‐term consequences such as retaliatory attacks and attacks aimed at the release of political prisoners cannot be ignored by policy makers.