Why electoral reform might improve representation and why it might make it worse

The debate over electoral reform has largely focused on representation in Parliament. However, the government largely controls policy‐making in parliamentary systems like Canada. This article shows that a more proportional system would increase the likelihood of coalitions. Because the dominant approach to studying representation in government, ideological congruence, suggests that reforming the electoral system would make no change to the level of representation, this article focuses instead on the representation of party preferences. It shows that multi‐party cabinets, common under proportional systems, involve a trade‐off between including more citizens’ preferred parties in government, while reducing the overall level of party preference representation.     

Evaluating Others If They Stand Up for Their Moral Convictions,and Evaluating Ourselves If We Don't Stand Up

Social Justice Research - Acting on one’s moral principles is not always easy. Upholding one’s moral beliefs may run counter to one’s social environment or situational demands. It...     

Rethinking Timing of First Sex and Delinquency

The relation between timing of first sex and later delinquency was examined using a genetically informed sample of 534 same-sex twin pairs from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, who were assessed at three time points over a 7-year interval. Genetic and environmental differences between families were found to account for the association between earlier age at first sex and increases in delinquency. After controlling for these genetic and environmental confounds using a quasi-experimental design, earlier age at first sex predicted lower levels of delinquency in early adulthood. The current study is contrasted with previous research with non-genetically informative samples, including Armour and Haynie (2007, Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 36, 141–152). Results suggest a more nuanced perspective on the meaning and consequences of adolescent sexuality than is commonly put forth in the literature.

Visas and work permits: Possible global negotiating initiatives

We discuss global options for initiatives intended to ameliorate adverse impacts of visa and work permit systems used by national governments around the world. We first describe and document some of their effects, noting the relative lack of other research work on these issues. We then discuss proposals for a new and supplemental global visa structure which have been made as part of the Mode 4 GATS negotiations in the WTO, suggesting that the GATS/WTO may be an imperfect institutional location for negotiating on these matters. We then evaluate other approaches, including what realistically could be possible if a new body specifically created for global negotiation in the area were to be used.

Governing Interlocal Cooperation: City Council Interests and the Implications for Public Management

Local government managers are described as key participants in the development of interlocal cooperation, but the interests of city councils in this process have gone largely unstudied. Here, the author addresses the theoretical importance of council-manager relations in interlocal public service cooperation. Three propositions identify areas of shared council-manager responsibility. Evidence from in-depth interviews with city council members is used to assess each proposition. While interlocal partnership has been described as a managerial activity, council members take an interest in network development and agreement assessment. Managers, on the other hand, give greater attention to public participation and education. The evidence refines assumptions about council-manager roles in the formation of cooperative agreements, with important implications for local government management.     

The optimal jury size when jury deliberation follows a random walk

The existing literature does not agree on the optimal jury size. We demonstrate that the probability of type I and type II errors is not sensitive to the number of jurors under the following three conditions: jurors receive independent signals about a defendant’s guilt during the evidence stage of the trial; the jurors truthfully reveal their signals before deliberations begin through their votes on the first ballot; and the jury’s deliberation follows a random walk. Since the opportunity cost of jury service is positive, this implies an optimal jury size of one.