Anarchism, Internationalism and Nationalism in Europe, 1860–1939

This article is part of a broader project on the social history or histories of anarchism. The standard accounts of anarchism (Nettlau, Joll, Woodcock, Marshall etc.) have been combinations of the histories of ideas and political/social movements. A larger project I am engaged in uses another methodology and is reliant upon the vast outpouring of published and unpublished academic writing on social history that has been produced since the 1960s. I will cover only several interconnected themes here: anarchism, internationalism and nationalism in Europe. This article will give a synoptic overview of the internationalism of the European anarchist and syndicalist movements during the “classical” period of anarchism (1860–1939). It focuses on the First and Second Internationals and the birth of the Third. It examines the ideology and culture of Internationalism, which was the nursery of the modern anarchist movement. The linkage between federalist and regionalist republicanism is stressed and the legacy of the Paris Commune of 1871 is highlighted. The desire to secure a global level playing field in labour markets promoted labour internationalism during the First International and a revival of this strategy by anarchists and syndicalists during the era of the Second International. The mismatch of industrial development and union density between industrialised Britain or Germany and artisanal and industrialising France and southern Europe limited internationalism in the 1860s and the 1900s. Equally the patriotic legacy of the Commune of Paris undermined the internationalism of anarchists and syndicalists when war broke out in 1914. In 1917–1918 anarchist and syndicalist internationalism seemed to be revived as Europe entered a period of revolutionary discontent. But very quickly the Bolsheviks and the Soviet Union channelled this wave into the Third International and ultimately the interests of the newly born Soviet State. Anarchist and syndicalist internationalism had little effect on the fortunes of the anarchists in the Spanish Civil War in a world of nation‐states and state‐centric political parties and movements.     

Stammwähler und die opportunistische Wahl parteipolitischer Programme

This article explains political radicalism by the number of voters who are biased towards a party. With little voters biased in favor of a party, this party has to rely more heavily on its programmatic distance to other parties. Because large parties – i.e.: parties with a high number of biased voters – gain votes when they move to the center of the political spectrum, parties with a lower number of voters that are biased in their favor are forced to the edges of the policy space. We draw on a computational model of political competition between four parties in a two‐dimensional policy space to investigate this relationship. We use panel corrected OLS estimates to analyze the data generated by the computer simulation. Our results substantiate the hypothesis of a negative relationship between the number of biased voters and the inclination of a party to adopt a more extreme policy stance.     

Kapital oder Kompensation? Erwerbsbiografien von Männern und die sozialen Beziehungen zu Verwandten und Freunden

Der Beitrag behandelt die Auswirkungen unterschiedlicher Beschäftigungsverhältnisse und berufsbiografischer Erfahrungen auf die Integration in soziale Beziehungen, insbesondere solche zu Freunden und Verwandten. Ein wichtiger Aspekt sind hierbei Erfahrungen von Diskontinuität und Unsicherheit auf dem Arbeitsmarkt, die nach Sennett auf den Bereich persönlicher Beziehungen übergreifen und die Integration in enge, verlässliche Beziehungen erschweren. Dem gegenüber gibt es allerdings auch theoretische Argumente für eine Kompensation berufsbiografischer Unsicherheiten durch eine verstärkte Hinwendung zu engen und stabilen Primärbeziehungen. Empirische Analysen mit den Daten des Familiensurvey 2000 zeigen sowohl negative Auswirkungen als auch kompensatorische Zusammenhänge, wobei letzteres wohl nur dann möglich ist, wenn das Unsicherheitsniveau nicht ein bestimmtes Maß übersteigt bzw. individuelle Bewältigungsressourcen vorhanden sind. Überraschenderweise sind nicht primär die Verwandtschaftsund Familienbeziehungen Basis solcher kompensatorischer Zusammenhänge, sondern Freundschaften.     

Demokratie, Autokratie und die regulative Gestaltung der Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen in Entwicklungsländern

This paper investigates into the political determinants of trade policy regulation in developing countries. When choosing between the trade policy instruments tariffs and quota governments consider the effects of these policies on their political support from interest groups and voters. It is argued that quantitative restrictions become increasingly less attractive as a country democratizes. Instead, motives of revenue generation gain importance. Therefore, the likelihood of democratic governments choosing quota is smaller than for their autocratic counterparts. Empirical tests based on a sample of 75 developing countries for the years 1979–1998 support the hypothesis.     

IPO effects: corporate restructuring when a firm goes public

The public affairs of a firm issuing an initial public offering (IPO) are a critical part of the corporate restructuring efforts which firms face during the process of going public. In this paper, Bowman and Singh's (1993) definition is used to illustrate how issuing an IPO is a significant form of corporate restructuring. Public affairs are critical during both the pre‐IPO phase and during the period leading up to the IPO, as the firm must negotiate a heavily institutionalised process to successfully complete the issue. Here, the six‐year life of ‘Deja News’ is used as a way to illustrate and explain the public affairs during the process of preparing for and issuing an IPO. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

Multiparty electoral competition in the Netherlands and Germany: A model based on multinomial probit

A typical assumption of electoral models of party competition is that parties adopt policy positions so as to maximize expected vote share. Here we use Euro-barometer survey data and European elite-study data from 1979 for the Netherlands and Germany to construct a stochastic model of voter response, based on multinomial probit estimation. For each of these countries, we estimate a pure spatial electoral voting model and a joint spatial model. The latter model also includes individual voter and demographic characteristics. The pure spatial models for the two countries quite accurately described the electoral response as a stochastic function of party positions. We use these models to perform a thought experiment so as to estimate the expected vote maximizing party positions. We go on to propose a model of internal party decision-making based both on pre-election electoral estimation and post-election coalition bargaining. This model suggests why the various parties in the period in question did not adopt vote maximizing positions. We argue that maximizing expected vote will not, in general, be a rational party strategy in multiparty political systems which are based on proportional representation.