Government policy for dangerous inventions in the United States and Great Britain

This study compares British and United States policy-making for nonmilitary dangerous inventions. It focuses on nine twentieth century invention groups ranging from electricity to biotechnology. Public policy for all nine dangerous inventions was very similar between the two countries. When inventions appeared, policy-makers in and out of government attempted to apply analogies of two types between existing technologies and the inventions: (1) the use to which an invention was put; and (2) the techniques used to achieve the invention's objective(s). Early societal formulations of these analogies set the stage for an unending iterative policy process. Components of this process included: technical progress toward an invention's power and effectiveness; technical progress toward an invention's safety; the number of innocent victims who might be hurt by an invention; the volume of government regulations; the degree of government rational-comprehensive decision-making with regard to the invention; and the degrees of centralization of government responses to the invention.     

The Credit Rating Agencies and the Subprime Mess: Greedy,Ignorant, and Stressed?

The credit rating agencies (CRAs) were an important component of the subprime mess. This article describes what the CRAs are, what they do, what roles they play, and how they fit into the regulatory system. It outlines the types of mortgage securities that the CRAs rate and outlines the evolution of the subprime mess. It then assesses three prime suspects in the CRAs' problems: incentives, ignorance, and stress. The author concludes that all three factors were important, that public officials were slow to react, and that additional safeguards have been put into place to prevent such problems in the future.

I feel that the rating agencies are somewhat of a mystically anointed monopoly, not unlike our good friends Fannie and Freddie, but with even less accountability.
—Representative Richard H. Baker, 2005
Everyone assumed the credit agencies knew what they were doing.
—Joseph Mason, credit expert at Drexel University, 2008