Do intergovernmental transfers affect the distribution of manufacturing production across regions in federal countries? Theory and evidence for Argentina

The effect of changes in the distribution of top-to-bottom intergovernmental transfers on the location of manufacturing production is analysed using a modified version of the footloose capital model. An increase in the share of transfers received by a region increases its share of manufacturing production the larger are transaction costs; the larger is the share of transfers going directly to consumers; the larger is the share of manufacturing consumption vis-à-vis non-tradable consumption; and the easier consumers can substitute among manufacturing varieties. Using data for Argentina for 1983-2005, the empirical analysis appears to support the existence of two distinctive regimes, with smaller/poorer provinces benefiting in terms of the location of manufacturing production as a response to an increase in transfers. Also, for these provinces, the benefits are greater if they are politically aligned with the federal government, especially through the receipt of discretionary transfers. For large/rich provinces, the evidence is less conclusive.     

Campaign‐Style Enforcement and Regulatory Compliance

This article examines the recoupling mechanism of campaign‐style enforcement and its effects on environmental regulatory compliance. Drawing on the policy implementation literature and institutional theory, the authors develop a conceptual model of campaign‐style enforcement in which both resource mobilization and power redistribution are theorized to address decoupling problems in regulatory compliance. The two‐pathway recoupling mechanism is evidenced by an empirical investigation of the implementation of China's energy conservation and emission reduction policy as part of that country's 11th Five‐Year Plan. Findings suggest that campaign‐style enforcement can effectively improve regulatory compliance when it addresses the efficiency/legitimacy conflict by providing policy incentives and reorganizing a clear hierarchy of political authority. The article concludes with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of campaign‐style enforcement.     

A turning point in Argentine politics: demands for change and territorial cleavages in the 2015 presidential election

The 2015 national, subnational, executive and legislative elections marked a turning point for Argentina's democratic history. For the first time, a non-Peronist centre-right coalition won the presidency. These elections also inaugurated the first non-Peronist governor of the Province of Buenos Aires in almost 30 years. This article tries to make sense of these elections, which represent a significant shift in the country's political direction. We argue that the incumbent left-party (Peronist Frente para la Victoria) faced a combination of electoral fatigue and mounting economic challenges. Sluggish economic growth and unabated inflation created an anti-incumbent demand for change, alienated the middle class and deepened territorial cleavages between the agricultural central region and the peripheral provinces. Against this backdrop, the combination of a unified opposition and a fragmented Peronism led to Mauricio Macri's victory. We also explore the challenges that the newly elected president faces, including minority in Congress and among governors.