Campaign‐Style Enforcement and Regulatory Compliance

This article examines the recoupling mechanism of campaign‐style enforcement and its effects on environmental regulatory compliance. Drawing on the policy implementation literature and institutional theory, the authors develop a conceptual model of campaign‐style enforcement in which both resource mobilization and power redistribution are theorized to address decoupling problems in regulatory compliance. The two‐pathway recoupling mechanism is evidenced by an empirical investigation of the implementation of China's energy conservation and emission reduction policy as part of that country's 11th Five‐Year Plan. Findings suggest that campaign‐style enforcement can effectively improve regulatory compliance when it addresses the efficiency/legitimacy conflict by providing policy incentives and reorganizing a clear hierarchy of political authority. The article concludes with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of campaign‐style enforcement.     

Decentralization and municipal governance: Suggested approaches for cross-regional analysis

The study of decentralization and municipal governance has captured much scholarly attention. This article highlights the importance of factors that have been generally ignored, and, in the process, suggests dimensions that facilitate comparison, including at the cross-regional level. First, regarding the creation and reform of decentralization policy, scholars may compare cases based on thehorizontal andex-post vertical political processes of reform. Second, cases can be compared based on the degree of center-statepolicy fluctuation, i.e., the institutions and incentives generating continual policy change and delayed outcomes, over time. Finally, I encourage scholars to scale down to the municipal level, comparing cases based on the following variables: historical state-municipal fiscal relations, institutional innovations, and the policy-making process. I close by explaining the various benefits associated with these approaches and the new research questions and challenges that they pose for comparative scholars. Eduardo J. Gómez is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at Brown University. His research interests are in federalism, decentralization, and the politics of economic and welfare reform in developing nations. I would like to thank James Mahoney, Richard Snyder, Melanie Cammett, Jonathan Rodden, Kent Eaton, Tyler Dickovick, Steven Webb, Stephan Haggard, Philip Oxhorn, William McCarten, Thomas Bossert, Javier Corrales, and four anonymous reviewers for excellent comments and suggestions.     

A turning point in Argentine politics: demands for change and territorial cleavages in the 2015 presidential election

The 2015 national, subnational, executive and legislative elections marked a turning point for Argentina's democratic history. For the first time, a non-Peronist centre-right coalition won the presidency. These elections also inaugurated the first non-Peronist governor of the Province of Buenos Aires in almost 30 years. This article tries to make sense of these elections, which represent a significant shift in the country's political direction. We argue that the incumbent left-party (Peronist Frente para la Victoria) faced a combination of electoral fatigue and mounting economic challenges. Sluggish economic growth and unabated inflation created an anti-incumbent demand for change, alienated the middle class and deepened territorial cleavages between the agricultural central region and the peripheral provinces. Against this backdrop, the combination of a unified opposition and a fragmented Peronism led to Mauricio Macri's victory. We also explore the challenges that the newly elected president faces, including minority in Congress and among governors.     

Congressional Institutionalization: A Cross‐National Comparison

This article explains variations in levels of institutionalization across legislatures of the world. It construes institutionalization as an equilibrium outcome that emerges from beliefs and investments made by political actors. Drawing insights from work on US congressional institutionalization and congressional organization, and on comparative party system institutionalization, it provides an index to measure congressional institutionalization. Using this index, it explores the constitutional factors that affect levels of congressional institutionalization. The empirical results raise a warning with respect to building comparative implications from an excessive focus on one particular case.     

Environmental management by law in China: The Guangzhou experience∗

Taking enviornmental management in Guangzhou as an example, this article explores the theory and practice of Communist China's idea of “environmental management by law.” Based on the Guangzhou experience, it argues that environmental management by law in China is mainly an administrative system of environmental management which takes law strictly as a tool for efficient and effective environmental protection. This system is operated on the principle of ‘rule by law’, and is the antithesis of the Maoist practice of “rule by person.” Contrary to its Western counterpart, China's environmental management system is built on a state‐centered conception of administrative law instead of a ‘right‐centered’ one which is the core of the ‘rule of law’ tradition.     

Adoption of Performance Measurement: Evidence of Mexican Municipalities

In this article we define and estimate empirical models to study the determinants of adoption of performance indicators by Mexican municipalities. Building upon previous studies, we prove whether the adoption decision depends on the locality size, variables related to resources, and the political/cultural differences. We implement the empirical models using the data from 300 municipalities for the year 2000. Unlike related literature that relies on surveys applied to local officials, our data from independent and dependent variables were obtained from different sources in order to avoid common-source bias. The estimated logit and probit models confirm the hypotheses.