Argentina,a 'Parasite State' on the Verge of Disintegration

Argentina has more than twice the total debt of India whilst the latter has 28 times more population in roughly equivalent territories. According to Poder Ciudadano, a local NGO, in 1999 Argentine political parties spent 440 times more than those of Chile. These gross asymmetries help to show that Argentina's financial troubles must be attributed to her own political practices rather than to adverse circumstances or foreign scapegoats. By December 2001, overspending had manifestly destroyed the Argentine financial system. Across-the-board violations of property rights followed, through bank withdrawal restrictions and a debt default that was the biggest in world economic history. This paper analyses the breakdown of federal institutions, the atomisation of power and the erosion of governability that ensued as a consequence of the financial crisis. Mafia-style political practices, an endemic evil in the background of Argentine politics, jumped to the forefront as a consequence of this institutional breakdown.     

The role of 'the resources of the power hypothesis' in explaining the Spanish welfare state between 1975–1995

There are two clearly differentiated parts to this work. The first consists of a review of the theoretical arguments that underlie the so–called 'resources of power hypothesis' . That theory has been used to explain the growth and development of the Welfare State in several European countries. The findings of a number of empirical works backing up that theory have also been included in this review. The intention of the second part is to check the theory against the Spanish case between 1975 and 1995. The conclusion of this work is that if, besides considering the ideological persuasion of the party controlling the government, we take into account the other relevant factors encompassed by the theory, then the 'resources of power hypothesis' is valid in explaining and interpreting the make–up and scope of the Spanish Welfare State.     

Hot spots policing in a high-crime environment: an experimental evaluation in Medellín

Journal of Experimental Criminology - Test direct, spillover, and aggregate effects of hot spots policing on crime in a high-crime environment. We identified 967 hot spot street segments and...     

A theory of executive dominance of congressional politics: the committee system in the Brazilian chamber of deputies

This article analyses the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies committee system using rational choice theories developed originally for the US Congress. We suggest that pure versions of these theories are unable to explain Brazilian committee politics, and point out the necessity of building a specific theory that takes into account key institutional characteristics which give the Brazilian Executive considerable power to control the legislative process to assure outcomes consistent with presidential preferences. We demonstrate that committees in Brazil operate to some degree as agents of the executive. For this reason, we call it the Theory of Executive Dominance.     

PROGRAMME CIHAE/ICHRPI – PROGRAM ICHRPI/CIHAE

SUMMARY

In this article a set of sources and methodology are presented for analyzing contemporary Parliaments, based on a case study focusing on the representatives of some of the different parliamentary chambers constituted during the period of the Spanish Transition (1977–82). The use of oral sources is emphasized in particular, since a sound understanding and management of these historiographical sources is a requirement set by the specific characteristics of what is known as the history of the present, in order to obtain information for its study. Moreover, oral history sources acquire a greater degree of importance in this study, as they form a vital element for the broadest possible form of micro-biographies of parliamentarians that will later allow for an in-depth prosopographical study.     

The deliveries cannot stop: Ecological (dis) advantages and socio-spatial safety tactics against predatory crimes among Brazilian couriers

In this article we discuss the reactions and responses of Brazilian motorcycle couriers (motoboys) to the risk of predatory crimes. We show that they work two simultaneous and overlapping “shifts”: the first involves carrying out their professional responsibilities, and the second, reducing the opportunities for victimization presented by those responsibilities. We analyse the socio-spatial tactics they adopt with a view to optimising security. These involve restricting their interactions and negotiations with neighbours and customers, as well as with criminals to guarantee that the deliveries are made and also to manage the various risks associated with working in different ecological areas. We explore the effect of these tactics on their activities, on labour relations and on attitudes to their customers in the delivery business. It concludes that both negotiation types point towards a process of expanding interactions, creating alternative distribution networks and seeking methods of protection against risks that cannot be overcome simply by the couriers protecting themselves.     

Optimal agency contracts: The effect of vicarious liability and judicial error

Under the doctrine of vicarious liability, a deep-pocket principal is often held responsible for a third-party harm caused by a judgment-proof agent’s negligence. We analyze the incentive contract used by the principal to control the agent’s behavior when a court can make an error in determining the agent’s negligence. We show that (1) reducing the error of declaring the agent not negligent even when he was (pro-defendant or type II error) is better than reducing the error of declaring the agent negligent even when he was not (pro-plaintiff or type I error) and (2) allowing the principal to penalize the agent even when the court declares the agent not negligent improves welfare. The latter supports the argument that causing an accident (or a reliable allegation of misconduct) should be sufficient to justify a “just cause” termination of an employee.