Identification of DYS385 allele variants by using shorter amplicons and Northern Thai haplotype data

Primers currently used for amplification of locus DYS385 on the Y chromosome give quite long amplicons that are difficult to resolve on native polyacrylamide gels. We therefore designed new primers that give much shorter products for easy separation. With this system, two allele variants that were characterized by sequencing as 14.1 (GAAA --> GAAAA) and 14.2 (GA insertion), were identified in two unrelated Northern Thai men due to their decreased mobility. Interestingly, initial capillary electrophoresis mistyped the 14.1 variant amplified with the traditional primers as allele 14. Forty different haplotypes were found in 147 Northern Thais with a haplotype diversity of 0.9430. Haplotype 13-18 (frequency 0.136) is the most frequent one: for comparison: haplotype 14-18 (frequency 0.074) was found to be the most common in a population from Bangkok (n = 95) in an earlier study. This striking difference within Thailand's population probably results from genetic differences in the founding populations.     

Power and Policy Design: A Comparison of Green Taxation in Scandinavian Agriculture

This article demonstrates the political importance of policy design in overcoming the opposition to the use of green taxes directed towards producers. The purpose of the article is to establish the link between the political power of producers and policy design. It is argued that the more politically powerful they are, the more likely policy makers are to reimburse tax revenues, to give producers control over the spending of the revenue and to design tax schemes in which there is a direct relationship between the subject being taxed and pollution. A comparison of fertilizer and pesticide tax policy making in Denmark, Norway and Sweden supports this argument.     

Efficient Rent-Seeking in Experiment

In a series of experiments we show that people learn to playthe efficient outcome in an open-ended rent-seeking game. Thisresult persists despite quite different experimentenvironments and designs, like different propensities ofcompetition, group sizes etc., and is interpretable as aresolution of the so-called Tullock paradox which states thatreal-world rent-seeking expenditures are much lower than whatthe standard rent-seeking model predicts.     

The Creation of Normative Facts

In Kelsen's formalist and reductionisttheory of law, the concepts of `authority' and`competence' may be explained exclusively in termsof those norms on which the validity of other legalnorms or of legal acts is dependent. Kelsen describesthe nature of these norms in different ways; at leastthree different conceptions can be distinguished. Arational reconstruction of the most plausible of theseconceptions will understand sentences expressing such`norms of competence' either to state truthconditions for normative sentences of a lower level orto state criteria for an act to be a legal act. Inboth functions, norms of competence regulate thecreation of normative facts.     

Governments,trade unions and the macroeconomy: An expository analysis of the political business cycle

We have briefly reviewed the state of the art of research on the political business cycle in the context of a simple textbook model of the macroeconomy. It has been demonstrated that the government-generated political business cycle vanishes as expectations turn rational. Even then, however, non-inflationary policies apparently are time inconsistent. Hence, democracies seem to be stuck with some sort of inflationary bias.Countries with fairly centralized wage bargaining and strong labor unions have to deal with a second political source of instability in the macroeconomy: if the labor union's program contains political items such as equal educational opportunities for working class children, extended co-determination, a more equal distribution of wealth, and the like, they will prefer to see those parties in power who show the best prospects of implementing those items. So the trade union's wage bargaining strategies take into account how bargaining results influence the state of the economy and, hence, the reelection prospects of the ruling government — and they will do so in different ways, depending on whether the union prefers the government to the opposition party or vice versa.