Restitution in America: Why the US Refuses to Join the Global Restitution Party

In the past generation, restitution law has emerged as a globalphenomenon. From its Oxbridge home, restitution migrated tothe rest of the Commonwealth, and ongoing Europeanization projectshave brought the common law of restitution into contact withthe Romanist concept of unjust enrichment, further internationalizingthis movement. In contrast, in the United States, scholarlyinterest in restitution, in terms of books, articles, treatises,symposia and courses on restitution, is meager. Similarly, whilerestitution, equity and tracing cases receive considerable treatmentat the highest levels of the English judiciary, US courts seemuninterested in these issues, rarely producing the theory-ladenopinions that have become quite common in the House of Lords.The situation is particularly curious because restitution isgenerally thought to be the invention of late nineteenth-centuryAmerican scholars. This article explains this divergence. Iargue that the Commonwealth restitution discourse is largelya product of pre- or anti-realist legal thought which generatesscepticism within the American academic-legal establishment.The article identifies the two dominant camps in American privatelaw thought—left-leaning redistributionalists and thecentre-right legal economists—and shows that neither hasany use for the Commonwealth's discourse. I conclude by analysingthe emerging drafts of the Restatement of Restitution and forecastthe future of American restitution law.     

The MMPI-2 Symptom Validity Scale (FBS) Is an Empirically Validated Measure of Overreporting in Personal Injury Litigants and Claimants: Reply to Butcher et al. (2008)

We address issues raised by Butcher et al. (Psychological Injury and the Law 1:191–209, 2008) in their critique of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 Symptom Validity Scale (FBS) and show that their analyses and conclusions are based on faulty premises, a misunderstanding of basic concepts in the assessment of overreporting, a selective review of the literature and mischaracterization of the findings they do cite, problematic analyses of a dataset that had already been similarly analyzed, and a flawed analysis of a legal case they discuss. We complement the review of existing research with some new findings that provide further empirical support and clarification of current interpretive recommendations for proper use of the FBS in evaluations of personal injury litigants and claimants.     

Do Rules Breed Rules? Vertical Rule-Making Cascades at the Supranational,National, and Organizational Level

Understanding where (ineffective) organizational rules come from is of vital importance for both public administration scholars and practitioners. Yet little is known about the underlying mechanisms that explain why external rules may cause organizational rule breeding and, as a by-product, red tape. Using a combination of archival and interview data, the authors empirically study rule-breeding processes in the case of Gasunie, which is a heavily regulated Dutch gas transport organization. The archival findings indicate that rule stocks have increased substantially over time at every policy level. Furthermore, the interview data support the notion that policymakers at different levels are jointly responsible for excessive rule breeding and, ultimately, organizational red tape.     

Nocebo Effects and Mild Traumatic Brain Injury: Legal Implications

Expectations may play a large role in health-related outcomes, but they may not be fully addressed or considered in medical–legal contexts. Contextual factors can influence a patient’s expectations for recovery following a concussion, including explicit or implicit messages from the media, healthcare providers and systems of care, and the forensic arena. This article discusses these factors as nocebo effects, that is, various inherently “inert” factors may create negative expectancies for recovery and therefore impede a given patient’s progress and recovery. It is argued that the negligence theory upon which the legal system is based tends to compound these nocebo effects. In accident-related concussions, both the accident itself and subsequent nocebo effects including potential healthcare and medical–legal provider negligence can create legal liability.     

Detection of the synthetic drug 4-fluoroamphetamine (4-FA) in serum and urine

4-Fluoroamphetamine (4-FA) was detected in the blood and urine of two individuals suspected for driving under the influence (DUI). The test for amphetamines in urine subjected to immunoassay screening using the CEDIA DAU assay proved positive. Further investigations revealed a 4-FA cross-reactivity of about 6% in the CEDIA amphetamine assay. 4-FA was qualitatively detected in a general unknown screening for drugs using GC/MS in full scan mode. No other drugs or fluorinated phenethylamines were detected. A validated GC/MS method was established in SIM mode for serum analysis of 4-FA with a limit of detection (LOD) of 1 ng/mL and a lower limit of quantification (LLOQ) of 5 ng/mL. Intra-assay precision was approx. 4% and inter-assay precision approx. 8%. Applying this method, the 4-FA serum concentrations of the two subjects were determined to be 350 ng/mL and 475 ng/mL, respectively. Given the pharmacological data of amphetamine, 4-FA psychoactive effects are to be expected at these serum levels. Both subjects exhibited sympathomimetic effects and psychostimulant-like impairment accordingly.     

The MMPI-2 Symptom Validity Scale (FBS) is an Empirically-Validated Measure of Over-reporting in Personal Injury Litigants and Claimants: reply to William et al. (2009)

We respond briefly to Williams et al.'s (Psychological Injury and the Law 2:182–197, 2009) most recent effort to critique the MMPI-2 Symptom Validity scale, noting that the authors repeat many of the unfounded claims and conclusions of Butcher et al. (Psychological Injury and the Law 1:191–209, 2008) while ignoring and/or reflecting a misunderstanding of many of the points raised in our rebuttal. Rather than repeat our detailed responses to their initial review, we limit this comment to addressing new points Williams et al. (Psychological Injury and the Law 2:182–197, 2009) bring up and offer a succinct summary of the issues raised in this exchange.