Vers une plus grande décentralisation du financement gouverne-mental au Québec

Abstract: This paper focuses on the degree of financial independence of local governments in the province of Quebec. The author shows that even if the Municipal Finance Reform (Bill 57) succeeded in achieving its goals, the level of financial dependence of local governments in Quebec remains among the highest in North America. Scenarios for further decentralization of financing and spending powers in Quebec are then briefly investigated. Sommaire. Cet essai discute de l'autonomie financière des localités québécoises. L'auteur souligne que mm̌ si la réforme de la fiscalitë municipale (Loi 57) a atteint ses objectifs, le degré d'autonomie financière des localités au Qukbec demeure un des plus faibles en Amérique du Nord. Plusieurs scénarios sont présentés dans l'optique d'une plus grande décentralisation des pouvoirs de financement et de dépense au Québec. “… N'est-ce pas une chose véritablement stupéfiante de voir une nation, plusieurs nations, toute l'humanité bientôt, dire à ses sages, à ses sorciers:” Je vous aime-rai et je vous ferai grands, si vous me persuadez que nous progressons sans le vouloir, inévitablement - en dormant; débarrassez-vous de la responsabilité, voilez pour nous l'humiliation des comparaisons, sophistiquez l'histoire, et vous pourrez vous appeler les sages des sages¹.“     

Management Strategies and Budgetary Politics

The study of public sector budgeting, particularly at the state level, has been dominated by incremental models of decision making. As a result, the budget has not always been viewed as an effective management tool for governors and other senior state officials. However, there are several critical issues which state leaders repeatedly face and for which the budget is the principal instrument for implementing decisions. This article identifies four key issues for the strategic management of state government and relates alternative approaches to each issue to the nature of budgetary politics. The first section raises the issues in the form of four questions. The next sections present alternative answers and discuss their political implications. Where appropriate, examples from the state of New York are included.     

STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT OF 1977

The implementation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) of 1977 in coal producing states is guided by a partial preemption policy approach t h a t establishes a balance between federal and state decision-making authority. The usefulness of this approach is assessed by analyzing state enforcement actions in relation the institutional capacity of states to shoulder regulatory responsibilities and the propensity of the federal Office of Surface Mining (OSM) t o oversee state enforcement actions and, if necessary, to undertake corrective action. Our results indicated that state administration of SMCRA was canstrained by the lack of effective federal oversight but was largely unaffected by interstate differences in political, economic, or administrative characteristics.     

Pricing in the nuclear power industry: Public or private interest?

This paper tests empirically the Ramsey version of the public-interest theory of regulation by examining the pricing practices in the nuclear power industry, using a 1985 cross-sectional sample of 40 electric utilities. Other researchers have avoided this segment of the industry because of difficulties with nuclear fuel data, or perceived differences in the underlying production function. We show that regulators respond to political influences according to the Stigler-Peltzman version of regulation and that Ramsey pricing cannot be validated, at least for the nuclear segment of the electric power industry.