Rethinking accountability in complex and horizontal network delivery systems

This paper revisits the conventional notion of accountability rooted in bureaucratic and hierarchical structures of government and advances an alternative conceptualization more useful for analyzing complex horizontal network delivery systems. Although such systems are increasingly prevalent, they often exacerbate the problem of accountability in the public sector. By examining regional economic development policy implementation in Manitoba, this article illustrates the prospects and challenges of adapting conventional constructs of accountability to horizontal network delivery systems.     

Bringing the PDS into the coalition equation

This article is intended to be a contribution to the study of the politics of the Anglo‐German relationship, and to the politics of NATO enlargement, seen purely within this context. It is not concerned with the validity of any strategic arguments concerning enlargement, the organisational or the financial problems stemming from this policy, or the wider strategic issues raised by this policy. From 1992 until 1 May 1997 the bilateral Anglo‐German relationship exhibited ever deeper fissures in policy on European integration, and on monetary union in particular. Yet, Anglo‐German policy in respect of NATO's eastern expansion and its relations with the new Russia, which reflected an integrating Europe from a different perspective, was characterised by fundamental agreement. This paradox, it is suggested, indicates that policy on Europe suffered more from ideological conflict on European integration within the governing Conservative Party during the period under review than from an inherent or necessary conflict of national interest between Britain and Germany.     

INCLUSIVE APPROACH

<正>Global integration strategy can address Africa’s infrastructure and employment woes The Silk Road Economic Belt and the21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,better known collectively as the Belt and     

Early Impacts of the Affordable Care Act on Health Insurance Coverage in Medicaid Expansion and Non‐Expansion States

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) aimed to achieve nearly universal health insurance coverage in the United States through a combination of insurance market reforms, mandates, subsidies, health insurance exchanges, and Medicaid expansions, most of which took effect in 2014. This paper estimates the causal effects of the ACA on health insurance coverage in 2014 using data from the American Community Survey. We utilize difference‐in‐difference‐in‐differences models that exploit cross‐sectional variation in the intensity of treatment arising from state participation in the Medicaid expansion and local area pre‐ACA uninsured rates. This strategy allows us to identify the effects of the ACA in both Medicaid expansion and non‐expansion states. Our preferred specification suggests that, at the average pre‐treatment uninsured rate, the full ACA increased the proportion of residents with insurance by 5.9 percentage points compared to 2.8 percentage points in states that did not expand Medicaid. Private insurance expansions from the ACA were due to increases in both employer‐provided and non‐group coverage. The coverage gains from the full ACA were largest for those without a college degree, non‐whites, young adults, unmarried individuals, and those without children in the home. We find no evidence that the Medicaid expansion crowded out private coverage.     

Buyer Beware: How Market Structure Affects Contracting and Company Performance in the Private Military Industry

Private military and security companies are integral components of the defense and intelligence operations of some of the world's most powerful states. Despite the increasingly pivotal role of contractors, analysts have yet to develop theories explaining when governments should outsource national security responsibilities or what conditions cause private defense markets to function efficiently. This inquiry addresses this gap in the literature by demonstrating that varying market structures—that is, the quantity of firms providing similar services and the number and purchasing power of those buying these services—have significant effects on costs, oversight, and company performance in the private defense industry. A principal–agent framework is developed to explain variation in the performance of firms in different markets across the industry. Evaluation of three private defense markets yields the surprising conclusion that monopsony, rather than a competitive market, is the ideal structure for governments outsourcing aspects of national defense.