Comparing Putin’s and Brezhnev’s Policies toward the Middle East

This article compares Moscow’s and Washington’s foreign policies toward the Middle East in 1982 and 2008. In 1982, Moscow and Washington each had a distinct set of friends and foes. In 2008, Washington still has a distinct set of friends and foes, but Moscow has relatively good relations with all governments and most major opposition movements in the region—the only exceptions being Al Qaeda and its affiliates. It is argued that Putin’s policy toward the Middle East is not really aimed at displacing the U.S. in the region, but protecting Russia and Russian interests from Al Qaeda and its allies. Indeed, a continued American presence in the region serves to protect Russian interests in the region.

Why Is the Estate Tax so Controversial?

There are some social issues whose significance for society nobody would seriously question but which nevertheless receive only scarce attention in sociological research. One of these is the bequest of private wealth from one generation to the next. It is currently estimated that about 550 billion dollars are transferred annually in the United States, amounting to more than 4% of the American gross national product (Havens and Schervish 1999). Not only is this a huge amount of wealth that changes ownership, but the bequest of wealth speaks to some of the core questions of sociological scholarship.

Close But Not Close Enough

The authors comment on an earlier aritice in Society by Eugene Goodheart and offer a novel hypothesis about the origins of religion.

An evolving policy network in action: The case of construction aggregate policy in Ontario

Abstract: The history of legislation to control aggregate mining reflects a power struggle between provincial and municipal interests. A content analysis of 140 Ontario Municipal Board (omb) hearings was assessed for a twenty‐five‐year period to evaluate the conflict between provincial and municipal governments and to document the role of legislation and policy in the resolution of the disputes. This article discusses the trend of successive Ontario governments to move the municipalities out of the core of the policy network dedicated to aggregate extraction. This is a result of the province's need to assure its greater autonomy in the industry in order to guarantee adequate stocks for future development. The province's autonomy allows a greater consideration to the industry and somewhat less consideration to the environmental impacts of aggregate mining. The article shows that there has been an evolution in the policy network from a “captured network” to a more “pluralist network.” Pushing the municipalities to the periphery through strong legislation has allowed the province to undermine the strength of the municipality to protect local interests primarily concerned with reducing the amount and impact of mining taking place near residential developments. Sommaire: L'histoire de l'élaboration de lois dans le but de contrôler l'extraction d'agrégats reflète une lutte de pouvoir entre les intérêts provinciaux et municipaux. Une analyse de 140 audiences de la Commission des affaires municipales de I'Ontario (camo) couvrant plus de vingt‐cinq ans a été réalisée afin d'évaluer le con‐flit survenu entre les gouvemements provincial et municipaux et de documenter le rô1e des lois et des politiques dans la résolution de conflits. Le présent article examine comment les gouvemements qui se sont succédés en Ontario ont eu tendance àéloigner les municipalités du ceur du réseau de politiques en matière d'extraction d'agrégats. Cela vient du fait que la province doive faire preuve d'une plus grande autonomie à 1'égard du rô1e de I'industrie afin que la province puisse garantir la disponibilité de stocks adéquats pour la mise en valeur future. L'autonomie de la province a permis d'accorder un plus grand rô1e à l'industrie et quelque peu moins d'importance aux incidences environnementales de l'exploitation des agrégats. Toutefois, l'article montre qu'il y a eu me évolution dans le réseau des responsables de politiques, celui‐ci étant passé d'un réseau de la capture à un réseau plus pluraliste. En repoussant les municipalités à la périphérie par le biais de lois puis‐santes, la province a pu réduire leur capacité de protéger les intérêts locaux qui visent principalement à réduire l'importance et l'incidence dc I'cxploitation minière a proximité des lotissements résidentiels.     

Justice Without Transition: Truth Commissions in the Context of Repressive Rule

While the study of transitional justice, and especially truth commissions, has gained in popularity over the past two decades, the literature is overwhelmingly focused on activities in democratizing states. This introduces a selection bias that interferes with proper analysis of causes and consequences of transitional justice on a global scale. In this paper, I discuss conditions under which new repressive elites, and even old repressive elites who survive to rule and repress in nominally new systems, may choose to launch broad investigations of the past. I argue that such a decision is based on two primary considerations, the presence of internally or externally based incentives (e.g., foreign aid) and the level of political control enjoyed by old elites in the new system. I apply this argument to post-Soviet Central Asia, including a detailed case study of Uzbekistan’s 1999 truth commission based on domestic media analysis and local elite interviews.

New Thinking in Financial Market Regulation: Dismantling the “Split Share Structure” of Chinese Listed Companies

China’s distinctive set of stock market institutions was introduced in 1990. Among the characteristics of China’s stock markets was a strict separation between different categories of investors. Listed companies issued different categories of shares to state shareholders, domestic corporate investors, domestic individual investors, and foreign investors. By 2005, the barriers segmenting China’s stock market had been significantly relaxed. Domestic investors were allowed to purchase shares previously reserved for foreign investors, and approved foreign investors were allowed to purchase shares previously earmarked for domestic individuals. Nevertheless, a crucial barrier remained. An ongoing debate among Chinese academics, investors, and policy makers focused on how to resolve the “split share structure” (guquan fen zhi) in which a minority of shares were tradable while the majority of shares (namely those reserved for domestic corporate and state shareholders) were excluded from the market. The split share structure was blamed for distorting prices and inhibiting development of the stock market. This paper analyzes the policy adopted to address the split share structure. To what extent does this policy change reflect new thinking on the part of China’s market regulators? This paper argues that analysis of policy making in China’s capital markets can help to distinguish between two competing assessments of China’s political economy. One account sees China pursuing a gradualist strategy, slowly but steadily expanding the role of markets. Another account sees China trapped in a semi-marketized and increasingly corrupt development pattern. The implementation of the split share structure reform program provides evidence to support the gradualist account of incremental, but persistent, reform. Mary Comerford Cooper is an assistant professor in political science at the Ohio State University. Her recent research focuses on the politics of financial markets in China and Taiwan. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Comparative Politics Research Workshop/ Globalization, Institutions and Economic Security Workshop at Ohio State University in May 2007, and at the annual meeting of the Association for Chinese Political Studies in July 2007. I benefited greatly from the constructive and insightful comments of Bj?rn Alpermann, Melanie Barr, Jean-Marc Blanchard, Sarah Brooks, Joseph Fewsmith, Sujian Guo, Dane Imerman, Ryan Kennedy, Marcus Kurtz, Xiaoyu Pu, James Reilly, Alex Thompson, Daniel Verdier, Jianwei Wang, Alan Wiseman, Bin Yu, and an anonymous reviewer. I am also grateful for Lan Hu’s exceptional research assistance. All remaining flaws are purely my own.