Individual Differences in Adolescents’ Emotional Reactivity across Relationship Contexts

Understanding individual differences in adolescents’ ability to regulate emotions within interpersonal relationships is paramount for healthy development. Thus, the effect of individual vulnerabilities (depressive affect, social anxiety, self-blame, and coping efficacy problems) on the transmission of emotional reactivity in response to conflict from family to peers (friends and romantic partners) was prospectively examined across six waves of data in a community-based sample of 416 adolescents (M_age Wave 1?=?11.90, 51% girls). Multiple-group models estimated in structural equation modeling suggested that youth who were higher in social anxiety or coping efficacy problems were more likely to transmit emotional reactivity developed in the family-of-origin to emotional reactivity in response to conflict in close friendships. Additionally, those youth higher in self-blame and depressive affect were more likely to transmit emotional reactivity from friendships to romantic relationships.     

Epidemiology of Suicide Attempts among Youth Transitioning to Adulthood

Suicide is the second leading cause of death for older adolescents and young adults. Although empirical literature has identified important risk factors of suicidal behavior, it is less understood if changes in risk factors correspond with changes in suicide risk. To address this knowledge gap, we assessed if there were different trajectories of suicidal behavior as youth transition into young adulthood and determined what time-varying risk factors predicted these trajectories. This study used four waves of data spanning approximately 13 years from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health. The sample included 9027 respondents who were 12–18 years old (M?=?15.26; SD?=?1.76) at Wave 1, 50% male, 17% Hispanic, and 58% White. The results indicated that 93.6% of the sample had a low likelihood for suicide attempts across time, 5.1% had an elevated likelihood of attempting suicide in adolescence but not young adulthood, and 1.3% had an elevated likelihood of attempting suicide during adolescence and adulthood. The likelihood of a suicide attempt corresponded with changes on depression, impulsivity, delinquency, alcohol problems, family and friend suicide history, and experience with partner violence. Determining how suicide risk changes as youth transition into young adulthood and what factors predict these changes can help prevent suicide. Interventions targeting these risk factors could lead to reductions in suicide attempts.     

Growth in Adolescent Self-Regulation and Impact on Sexual Risk-Taking: A Curve-of-Factors Analysis

Adolescent self-regulation is increasingly seen as an important predictor of sexual risk-taking behaviors, but little is understood about how changes in self-regulation affect later sexual risk-taking. Family financial stress may affect the development of self-regulation and later engagement in sexual risk-taking. We examined whether family financial stress influences self-regulation in early adolescence (age 13) and growth in self-regulation throughout adolescence (from age 13–17 years). We then assessed the effects of family financial stress, baseline self-regulation, and the development of self-regulation on adolescent sexual risk-taking behaviors at age 18 years. Using a curve-of-factors model, we examined these relationships in a 6-year longitudinal study of 470 adolescents (52% female) and their parents from a large northwestern city in the United States. Results indicated that family financial stress was negatively associated with baseline self-regulation but not with growth in self-regulation throughout adolescence. Both baseline self-regulation and growth in self-regulation were predictive of decreased likelihood of engaging in sexual risk-taking. Family financial stress was not predictive of later sexual risk-taking. Intervening to support the development of self-regulation in adolescence may be especially protective against later sexual risk-taking.     

Introduction: Ideology,Propaganda, and Political Discourse in the Xi Jinping Era

The ideology, propaganda, and political discourse of the Communist Party of China (CPC) have continued to function as key elements of the political system of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the post-Maoist period since 1978. In the first term of the Xi Jinping leadership (2012–2017), the CPC, for instance, elaborated on its guiding ideological concepts, devised inventive ideational framings of phenomena usually perceived as tangible (such as the “New Normal”), engaged in complex intellectual debates on crucial topics (such as “eco-civilization”), intensified and diversified its argumentation patterns and discursive strategies, and consolidated ideational governance over some citizens’ individual values, beliefs, and loyalties. Furthermore, it is often no longer possible to differentiate between the CPC’s internal and external propaganda, as seemingly exclusively domestic ideational and discursive issues increasingly correlate with international phenomena. However, the trends in the Xi era do not present paradigmatic shifts, but rather an overall reassertion-cum-innovation of previous Maoist and post-Maoist uses of ideology, propaganda, and political discourse, primarily aiming at strengthening one-party rule.     

Whose New Normal? Framing the Economic Slowdown Under Xi Jinping

After decades of double-digit economic growth, China experienced a significant drop in GDP growth rates in the wake of the global financial crisis. For the new Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping, who had assumed power in the fall of 2012, analysts predicted a looming crisis due to the alleged decline in the regime’s performance legitimacy. This article argues against a mechanistic application of the notion of performance legitimacy. Instead, it proposes to take into account the role of ideology in mediating public perceptions of regime performance. By tracking the career of the concept of “new normal” in Chinese public discourse over a period of three years – from late 2013 to late 2016 – it shows how the economic slowdown has been framed in ways conducive to the reproduction of regime legitimacy. The findings suggest an intense process of ideological contestation and decontestation, in which the domestic reflection of foreign audiences and their recognition of the Chinese regime’s performance have gained in importance.     

Reading between the lines: party cues and SNP support for Scottish independence and Brexit

Scotland’s future within the European Union (EU) played a prominent role in the 2014 independence referendum. The story goes that latent supporters of independence voted to stay within the UK to maintain EU access. Defeated, Scottish leaders declared the referendum a once-in-a-life-time event only repeated if conditions substantially changed. With the UK now facing a chaotic exit from the EU, proponents of Scottish independence have suggested that a second referendum may occur after Brexit negotiations are completed. Faced with a consensus among Scottish party leaders in supporting EU membership, those hoping for a second independence referendum, we argue, looked to alternate sources of information that saw Brexit as an opportunity to create the conditions that would spur a second referendum. Using panel data from the British Election Study, we examine whether Scottish voters voted tactically to leave the EU. We argue that Scottish National Party voters were likely to interpret statements on the conditions for a second independence referendum as an implicit signal to vote “Leave.” The results have important implications for the role of referendums in representative democracy, strategic voting, and the importance of intra-party division on individual vote choices.