Policy Diffusion and Program Scope: Research Directions

A major omission in diffusion research is the scope of changein program adoptions. Diffusion studies focus almost exclusivelyon the rate of change, thus ignoring possible variance in thecontent of programs selected by leaders, followers, and laggards.States may adopt new programs in one area, such as state-mandatedstudent testing. While most states now have a testing policy,these policies vary in terms of the number of students subjectto examinations. Thus, the amount of program change dependson the content of each state's policy. An interstate diffusionstudy of the pattern of program adoptions ignores this variance.It is also possible that policy scope is influenced by certainaspects of the diffusion process. One possibility is that programinnovators generally select more extensive programs than followers.Similarities or differences in policy scope among adopters mayalso be related to innovation attributes (e.g., whether a newprogram is symbolic, redistributive, or administratively complex).Finally, the number of years required for interstate diffusionmay result in similarities or differences in policy content.     

Sharing American and European economic experiences in technology conversion

After 50 years, the cold war is finally over. It was the longest and most costly war in modern history. The soldiers can return home. The world can go back to being normal. But what, after all this time, is “normal”? In what kind of world are the soldiers returning home? It is a world in economic chaos; a world in recession; a world redefining itself and everything in it. It is a world like none ever seen before in history. While some argue that the American economy converted successfully before and after WWI, WWII, the Korean War, and even the Vietnam War, the depth and extent of those earlier conversions were of much smaller magnitude as compared to the end of the cold war.     

Policy research in sub-Saharan Africa: An exploration

This article argues that a major problem with contemporary policy analysis is that it has difficulty coming to terms with complex economic change. This in turn is probably influenced by a view of socioeconomic systems that still harks back to the classical mechanics of the nineteenth century and a relatively stable world in which social action could reasonably be informed by disinterested scientific research of a traditional kind. By means of a review of some recent policy analysis literature and by focusing on issues relating to development issues in contemporary Africa, the article maintains that a more realistic approach would recognize the evolutionary nature of modern socioeconomic systems and base policy interventions accordingly. In particular, there is a need to see ‘policy’ as a process of complex change requiring innovative institutional contexts and novel managerial capabilities.     

THE LOGICAL LIMITS OF BEST PRACTICE ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Developing countries are pressured to adopt administrative solutions that the international community considers best practice. Some claim that these practices do not fit such contexts. How could one assess the fit or relevance of a best practice? This article suggests a basic answer: Look at the degree of difference between the proposed adoption context and the context in which such practice emerged as ‘best’. This answer emerges from a discussion on the basis of the new institutional ideas about change and diffusion. An empirical analysis of public financial management reform in African countries suggests support for this answer: Good practices are most evident in countries least different to the developed nations where practices originated and least evident in countries most different to these developed nations. The article contributes to a literature on best practice and yields fundamental messages for development, including the point that best practices are limited as administrative solutions in many developing countries. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Examining Parties as Procedural Cartels: Evidence from the U.S. States

Procedural cartel theory states that the majority party exerts influence over legislative outcomes through agenda control. This research tests predictions from the party cartel theory in five state legislatures. I assess party influence through comparison of term‐limited and nonterm‐limited legislators. I argue that term‐limited legislators (who are not seeking elective office) are no longer susceptible to party pressure, making them the perfect means to determine the existence of party influence. The results demonstrate that party influence is present in these legislatures. I find that party influence is magnified on the procedural, rather than final‐passage, voting record which is precisely where procedural cartel theory predicts. I find lower levels of ideological consistency and party discipline among members for whom the party leadership offers the least—those leaving elective office. These results provide support for party cartel theory, demonstrating further evidence of how parties matter in modern democracies.