Is Penalty Enhancement a Sound Idea?

Law and Philosophy -     

Comparison of natural and artificial aging of ballpoint inks

Abstract:  Solvent evaporation caused by aging from ballpoint inks was measured by gas chromatography/mass spectroscopy (GC/MS). The sample preparation was carried out with two different thermal desorption systems. The results are compared. Thirteen inks were classified with regard to their solvents, polymers, and additives. The variation of the aforementioned compounds caused by aging was monitored for naturally and artificially aged samples. In this paper, the results are compared and discussed with respect to forensic casework.     

Vertrag über Stabilit?t, Koordinierung und Steuerung in der WWU und Europ?ischer Stabilit?tsmechanismus

Anfang Februar 2012 unterzeichneten die 17 Euro-Staaten den Vertrag über die Einrichtung eines permanenten Europ?ischen Stabilit?tsmechanismus ("ESM-Vertrag"). Einen Monat sp?ter wurde von 25 der 27 EU-Mitgliedstaaten der Vertrag über Stabilit?t, Koordinierung und Steuerung in der Wirtschafts- und W?hrungsunion ("VSKS") zum Abschluss gebracht. Beide Vertr?ge sind Teil des Krisenbew?ltigungsprogramms in der Union, stehen aber au?erhalb des EU-Vertragswerks. Aufgrund der Ausgestaltung als rein zwischenstaatliche Vereinbarungen werfen die beiden Vertr?ge hinsichtlich ihres Verh?ltnisses zu und ihrer Vereinbarkeit mit dem Recht der Europ?ischen Union einige interessante Fragen auf, die der vorliegende Beitrag n?her untersuchen will.     

The death-qualified jury and the defense of insanity

We predicted that people who are excluded from serving on juries in capital cases due to their opposition to the death penalty (excludable subjects) tend to place a greater value on the preservation of due process guarantees than on efficient crime control, and therefore are more likely to accept an insanity defense in criminal cases than are people who are permitted to serve on capital juries (death-qualified subjects). Subjects who had previously been classified as death-qualified or excludable read four summaries of cases in which the defendant entered a plea of insanity, and made judgments of guilt or innocence. In the two cases involving nonorganic disorders (schizophrenia), death-qualified subjects were significantly more likely than excludable subjects to vote guilty; in the two cases involving organic disorders (mental retardation and psychomotor epilepsy), there were no differences between the two groups. In addition, excludable subjects gave significantly higher estimates than death-qualified subjects of the proportion of defendants pleading insanity who really are insane.     

The World is More Just for Me than Generally: About the Personal Belief in a Just World Scale's Validity

Differences between personal and general belief in a just world were studied in four questionnaire studies and one experiment. Personal just world belief could reliably be differentiated from general just world belief, and subjects endorsed more strongly the personal compared to the general just world belief. Moreover, personal belief in a just world predicted subjective well-being and self-esteem, and this positive impact was independent of general just world belief and favorable self-perceptions. Finally, the more subjects were aware of their own unfairness, the more the personal belief in a just world showed a negative impact on self-esteem. Results give evidence to the just world beliefs' character as world views and as indicators of a personal contract between individual and social world.     

Informal institutions rule: institutional arrangements and economic performance

Institutions are widely believed to be important for economic development. This paper attempts to contribute to our understanding of how institutions matter by examining the effect of formal and informal institutional arrangements on economic progress. Formal institutions represent government defined and enforced constraints while informal institutions capture private constraints. The findings suggest that the presence of informal institutions is a strong determinant of development. In contrast, formal institutions are only successful when embedded in informal constraints, and codifying informal rules can lead to negative unintended consequences. This suggests that institutions cannot be easily transplanted in order to spur economic development.