You Win Some, You Lose Some: Constitutional Reforms in Chile's Transition to Democracy

Chile's 1989 constitutional reforms constituted a trade-off: the military gave up protected democracy provisions but acquired greater autonomy. The democratic opposition could accept or reject, but not modify, constitutional changes proposed by the outgoing dictatorship. This study addresses a very limited time period in the transition to democracy: the moment after the transition has been secured and transitional rules have been established. The dynamics of this period differ markedly from those in the larger democratic transition. The approach in this study complements alternative explanations of why the 1989 reforms benefited the outgoing dictatorship more than the incoming democratic government. Although the outgoing regime granted several opposition demands by reducing restrictions on political pluralism and eliminating barriers to political party activity, it also secured provisions that made the military more independent of civilian authorities than originally conceived in the 1980 Constitution.     

The effects of death qualification on jurors' predisposition to convict and on the quality of deliberation

This study provides a straightforward test of the proposition that people who are permitted to serve on juries in capital cases (death-qualified jurors) are more likely to convict a defendant than are people who are excluded from serving on capital juries due to their unwillingness to impose the death penalty (excludable jurors). A sample of 288 subjects classified as death-qualified or excludable under theWitherspoon standard watched a 2 1/2-hour videotape of a simulated homicide trial including the judge's instructions, and gave an initial verdict. Death-qualified subjects were significantly more likely than excludable subjects to vote guilty, both on the initial ballot and after an hour's deliberation in 12-person juries. Nine juries were composed entirely of death-qualified subjects (death-qualified juries), while 10 contained from 2 to 4 excludable subjects (mixed juries). On postdeliberation measures, with initial death-penalty attitudes controlled, subjects who had served on the mixed juries were generally more critical of the witnesses, less satisfied with their juries, and better able to remember the evidence than subjects from the death-qualified juries, suggesting that diversity may improve the vigor, thoroughness, and accuracy of the jury's deliberations.     

Power comes with responsibility��or does it?

In a Public Good (PG) experiment, after playing it the standard way, one of the players (the allocator) is given power over the endowments of her co-players. Will the allocator show responsibility i.e., contribute most or all of her own as well as her co-players?? endowments? Can we thus improve the suboptimal level of voluntary provisions of public goods? The result is that, on average, all players are better off than in the standard PG game. In repetitions of the procedure, however, selfish behavior (contributing mainly the others?? endowments) becomes more and more frequent.