Criminal justice and the nineteenth-century paradigm

This article examines the influence of psychological individualism on nineteenth-century law and criminal justice policy. The nineteenth century—a formative period both for American law and for human sciences—was dominated by a single overarching conception of human behavior. This article explores the implications and consequences of that domination by first examining the general conditions under which individualism flourished in the United States, and then focusing on specific criminal justice policies that were pemised on this individualistic paradigm. It suggests that individualistic assumptions about human behavior were incorporated into what became intractable legal and institutional forms. The article also develops the relationship between law and human science during this period, and the way in which criminal justice policies were advanced as scientific doctrines. Finally, it concludes with a brief discussion of the role played by psychology in criminal justice policy since the nineteenth—century, and the recent resurgence of psychological individualism.     

Detecting Manipulation in Futures Markets: The Ferruzzi Soybean Episode

Manipulation—the exercise of market power in a futuresmarket—is a felony, but recent court and regulatory decisionshave made conviction of a manipulator problematic. Instead,regulators attempt to prevent manipulation. Deterrence by convictionis more efficient than prevention if manipulations can be detectedwith high probability. An analysis of the Ferruzzi soybean episodeof 1989 demonstrates how to detect manipulation with standardstatistical techniques. It is exceedingly unlikely that theprice and quantity relations observed in May and July 1989 werethe result of competition; they instead reflect market power.The ability to detect manipulation reliably suggests that existingregulation of manipulation in futures and securities marketsis inefficient because it relies on costly prevention ratherthan deterrence.     

The power to make war: Congress' search for an effective role

In the heat of Vietnam and Watergate, Congress sought to develop a more effective role in decisions about the use of the armed forces in combat or in potential combat situations. The War Powers Resolution passed in November 1973 was the solution Congress devised to this problem. But the War Powers Resolution has fallen well short of the hoped-for partnership; the most momentous issue to confront the nation-to wage war or not to wage war-still does not effectively engage Congress. Whether such a role is possible for Congress in a system that is built on checks and balances is quite uncertain. Some improvements over the present situation are proposed; but it remains evident that the power to make war will rest primarily in the office of the president.     

The Premises of Decision-Making within the Australian Public Service

Decision-making is usually studied in the context of a particular choice or institution. This article proposes an alternative, cross-cutting approach. It argues that federal policy-making involves three forms of rationality — technical, economic and political. Standard operating procedures develop around each. This simplifies much decisionmaking but may also produce narrowness of outlook and a failure to see other dimensions to a policy problem.