Making a Cold War in the Near East: Turkey and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1947

During the post-war negotiations in the years of 1945 and 1946, the Soviets launched a bitter war of nerves against Turkey in order to establish a military base in Istanbul and share control of the Straits. It was crucial for Britain that the USSR be prevented from gaining any influence in Turkey. However, as Britain was in no position to support Turkey financially, American authorities encouraged by London and Ankara took over the responsibility for Turkey. This articles examines the Great Powers rivalry over Turkey and Turkey’s response to it. It argues that regional factors other than US–Soviet confrontation, such as Turkey’s security search against the Soviets, also played a crucial part in starting the Cold War in the Near East.     

The Fall and Renewal of the Commission: Accountability, Contract and Administrative Organisation

The fall of the Santer Commission, prompted by the Report of the Committee of Independent Experts, sent shock waves throughout the entire Community. This article seeks to examine the nature of the problems which beset the Commission, to place these within the broader context of decision-making by public bodies, and to consider also the responsibilities of the Council and European Parliament for the delivery of agreed Community policies. The article analyses in detail the Reports of the Committee of Independent Experts, and the subsequent reforms initiated by the Prodi Commission, in order to assess the prospects for improved service delivery in the future.     

The fairness of sanctions: some implications for optimal enforcement policy

In this article we incorporate notions of the fairness of sanctionsinto the standard model of public enforcement. When both theprobability and magnitude of sanctions may be varied, the usualsolution involves a very high sanction and a relatively lowprobability of enforcement if individuals are risk neutral.When the issue of fairness is added to the analysis, the optimalsanction generally is not extremely high because such a sanctionwould be seen as unfair. The optimal probability of imposingsanctions may be higher than in the usual case (to offset thelower sanction) or lower than in the usual case (because thelower sanction reduces the effectiveness of enforcement).