Tolerance and Liberal Justice

Tolerance, the mere “putting up” with disapproved behaviour and practices, is often considered a too negative and passive engagement with difference in the liberal constitutional state. In response, liberal thinkers have either discarded tolerance, or assimilated it to the moral and legal precepts of liberal justice. In contradistinction to these approaches I argue that there is something distinctive and valuable about tolerance that should not be undermined by more ambitious, rights‐based models of social cooperation. I develop a conception of tolerance as a complementary principle and an interim value that is neither incompatible with, nor reducible to, rights‐based liberalism. Tolerance represents a particular, non‐communitarian expression of the general dictum that the liberal state, having released its citizens into liberty, rests on social presuppositions it cannot itself guarantee.     

The RWJF Reclaiming Futures Initiative: Improving Substance Abuse Interventions for Justice‐Involved Youths

Juvenile justice systems in the United States do not always respond effectively to substance abuse problems among young offenders. In 2002, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation launched a 10‐community demonstration project to address this problem. Reclaiming Futures (RF) relies on community partnerships to improve treatment quality, strengthen local leadership, expand inter‐organizational collaboration, and create systems of shared performance management. The initial findings of a cross‐site evaluation suggest that Reclaiming Futures is yielding important and positive change. Bi‐annual surveys of key informants measure the quality and integration of juvenile justice and substance abuse treatment systems in each community. Of 13 indices measured by the surveys, 11 showed significant improvements between 2003 and 2005.     

SUPERMAX INCARCERATION AND RECIDIVISM*

Since the early 1980s, supermax incarceration has emerged as a common feature of the American corrections landscape. This special type of high‐cost housing, which involves extended isolation with little programming or contact with others, remains largely unevaluated and is of interest for three reasons. First, the study of supermax housing offers a unique opportunity to understand the factors related to the successful reentry of offenders back into society. Second, it affords an opportunity to test the claims, many of which are grounded in mainstream criminological theory, that have been made about the putative effects of supermax confinement. Third, it provides an empirical touchstone that can help inform policy debates about the merits of such confinement. Examining data from the Florida Department of Corrections, we test competing hypotheses about the effects of supermax housing on 3‐year recidivism outcomes. We find evidence that supermax incarceration may increase violent recidivism but find no evidence of an effect of the duration of supermax incarceration or the recency of such incarceration to the time of release into society. We discuss the findings and their implications for theory, research, and policy.     

AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF DETERRENCE: CHEATING,SELF‐SERVING BIAS,AND IMPULSIVITY*

This paper reports results from a randomized experiment in which 256 participants recruited to complete a survey could earn extra payment by cheating on a quiz. We report the first deterrence experiment that incorporates significant elements of situational and individual difference theories of crime into a single analytic framework. Consistent with extant deterrence research, the prevalence of cheating was lower when detection was more certain but not when the penalty was more severe. Further, cheating was more likely among participants with stronger present‐orientation, or who were prone to self‐serving bias.     

AGE,CRIMINAL CAREERS,AND POPULATION HETEROGENEITY: SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF A NONPARAMETRIC,MIXED POISSON MODEL*

This article addresses three issues that are central to the criminal career debate. First, is the life course of individual offending patterns marked by distinctive periods of quiescence? Second, at the level of the individual, do offending rates vary systematically with age? In particular, is the age-crime curve single peaked or flat? Third, are chronic offenders different from less active offenders? Do offenders themselves differ in systematic ways? Using a new approach to the analysis of individual criminal careers—based on nested, mixed Poisson models in which the mixing distribution is estimated nonparametrically—we analyze a panel data set that tracks a sample of males for more than 20 years. Our results provide empirical evidence in support of some features of criminal propensity theory and some in support of conventional criminal careers theory. In support of latent-trait criminal propensity theory, the individual-level average offense rate (per unit of time) varies as a function of observable individual-level characteristics and unobservable heterogeneity among individuals, and the age trajectory of the offense rate is generally single peaked rather than flat. On the other hand, in support of conventional criminal careers theory, models that incorporate a parameter that permits periods of active as well as inactive offending across age have greater explanatory power than those that do not. In addition, the nonparametric, discrete approximation to the population distribution of unobservable heterogeneity in the individual-level mean offense rate facilitates identification of four classes of offenders—nonoffenders as well as individual-level characteristics that are unique to each group. Problems of theoretical explanation and empirical generalizability of these results are described.     

Humanitarian Intervention and Communal Civil Wars:

How do policymakers in democratic nations mobilize support for hard-line strategies? Existing answers to this question emphasize the exaggeration of external threats. Yet this overlooks an important dilemma: because democratic citizens expect their leaders to explore peaceful solutions or less aggressive alternatives when foreign dangers are ambiguous, the same conditions that make threat inflation necessary also make it difficult to employ successfully. To mobilize support for hard-line measures when the public wants its leaders to demonstrate restraint, policymakers may therefore attempt to shift blame onto an adversary by using “counterfeit diplomacy.” Specifically, democratic leaders may adopt more cooperative or less coercive options than they believe are necessary, but which they anticipate will fail. This approach can be a risky one, however, because an opponent might accept a nation's demands, accede to its conditions, or offer counterproposals in the hope of diffusing support for more confrontational measures.     

Why are the highly educated more sympathetic towards welfare recipients?

Stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients play a crucial role in building public support for welfare retrenchment. Existing literature finds that the highly educated are more sympathetic towards welfare recipients. This is surprising given the economic advantage associated with educational attainment. Furthermore, educational attainment has increased even as sympathy for welfare recipients has declined. I address these puzzles using three decades of British survey data and find that it is the socially liberal attitudes rather than the economic advantage associated with higher education that explains why this group is sympathetic towards welfare recipients. These findings reveal an educational cleavage in stereotypes about welfare recipients, which is based on non-economic concerns, and has implications for support for welfare retrenchment and policies such as increased conditionality. This cleavage is weaker in more highly educated regions, implying that there are diminishing returns from increasing educational attainment in terms of sympathetic attitudes towards welfare recipients.