DETERRENCE,CRIMINAL OPPORTUNITIES,AND POLICE

In this article, we join three distinct literatures on crime control—the deterrence literature, the policing literature as it relates to crime control, and the environmental and opportunity perspectives literature. Based on empirical findings and theory from these literatures, we pose a mathematical model of the distribution of criminal opportunities and offender decision making on which of those opportunities to victimize. Criminal opportunities are characterized in terms of the risk of apprehension that attends their victimization. In developing this model, our primary focus is on how police might affect the distribution of criminal opportunities that are attractive to would‐be offenders. The theoretical model we pose, however, is generalizable to explain how changes in other relevant target characteristics, such as potential gain, could affect target attractiveness. We demonstrate that the model has important implications for the efficiency and effectiveness of police deployment strategies such as hot spots policing, random patrol, and problem‐oriented policing. The theoretical structure also makes clear why the clearance rate is a fundamentally flawed metric of police performance. Future research directions suggested by the theoretical model are discussed.     

The “Golden Age” Senate And Floor Debate in the Antebellum Congress

An image of an antebellum “golden age” of Senate debate and deliberation has passed virtually unblemished from one generation of historians and political analysts to the next. In what ways, if any, is the image of a more deliberative Senate evident in the realities of antebellum House and Senate debates? In this article, I present a series of case studies to examine elements of the quantity and quality of floor debate in each chamber. By providing comparative evidence about House and Senate debate during the antebellum period, I offer an assessment and critique of the bicameral implications of the largely untested “golden age” understanding of the Senate and join other recent efforts to reassess the nature of the early Senate and its relation to the House. My results show the conventional wisdom to be an oversimplification, at least in its implications about the scope and depth of House debates. The House debated as long, and arguably as well, as the Senate on the signal issues of the day.     

THE STABILITY OF CRIMINAL POTENTIAL FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADULTHOOD*

This paper examines two alternative interpretations of the well-documented positive association between past and future criminal behavior. One is that prior participation has a genuine behavioral impact that increases the likelihood of future participation. The second is that there are stable, unmeasured differences in criminal potential across the population. Many general theories of crime can be interpreted as suggesting one of these interpretations. Based on an analysis of a panel data set that tracks a sample of males for over 20 years, the results suggest that the positive association is largely attributable to stable, unmeasured individual differences.     

The three stages of the anti-incumbency vote: Retrospective economic voting in young and established democracies

Economic prosperity is the best recipe for an incumbent government to be re-elected. However, the financial crisis was significantly more consequential for governing parties in young rather than in established democracies. This article introduces the age of democracy as a contextual explanation which moderates the degree to which citizens vote retrospectively. It shows a curvilinear effect of the age of democracy on retrospective economic voting. In a first stage after the transition to democracy, reform governments suffer from a general anti-incumbency effect, unrelated to economic performance. In a second step, citizens in young democracies relate the legitimacy of democratic actors to their economic performance rather than to procedural rules, and connect economic outcomes closely to incumbent support. As democracies mature, actors profit from a reservoir of legitimacy, and retrospective voting declines. Empirically, these hypotheses are corroborated by data on vote change and economic performance in 59 democracies worldwide, over 25 years.     

DOES THE TIME CAUSE THE CRIME? AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TIME SERVED AND REOFFENDING IN THE NETHERLANDS*

This work uses a sample of Dutch offenders, serving an average of 6.7 months of confinement, to examine the relationship between time served in prison and future criminality. To overcome the selection issues inherent in this examination, this article introduces a new method to the criminological literature that relies on a generalization of the propensity score to control for observed differences in offenders sentenced to different periods of confinement. On the whole, very little evidence of a relationship between time served and future offending was found. In particular, 3‐year reconviction rate and the proportion of offenders reconvicted in the next 3 years do not seem to depend on incarceration length. Although a relationship between time served and future sentence length was found, the evidence is modest.     

Reforms for Improved Efficiency in Public Budgeting and Finance: Improvements,Disappointments, and Work‐in‐Progress

The past half‐century has brought heightened expectations for what systems of budgeting and finance may be expected to deliver for the public. From systems to provide a first defense against theft and gross misappropriation, they have become systems to help lawmakers direct public resources where they can give the best public return, to help managers efficiently utilize resources under their control, and to communicate plans and results to the public. Government fiscal systems have developed more useful expenditure classification, established new measures for identifying public performance, brought nontraditional spending into control systems, and made finances considerably more transparent. Systems should, in combination with robust democratic institutions, make the public sector perform in the best interests of the citizenry. But in the face of great fiscal system improvements, governments struggle with staying fiscally sustainable, with meeting financial obligations to vulnerable populations, and even with avoiding default, receivership, or bankruptcy. Even as systems improve, government finances decline amid considerable private sector prosperity. Research over the past decade has done little to aid or explain the sweeping expectation and limited success of budget systems to transform essential elements of governance. It is the purpose of this paper to review progress in the development of robust fiscal systems, identify the major obstacles and failures, and link this evidence to the record of recent governmental financial distress, paying particular attention to the struggles of American governments. The broader questions needing to be addressed are the same questions at the forefront of public sector finance 100 years ago; however, the present focus has not been on these broader implications.