Triggers for protest: Modelling responses to the political context in Britain, 2000–2002

Abstract.  Failing to take into account the impact of the political context on protest has serious empirical and theoretical implications for our understanding of the phenomenon. First, it means that protest is conceptualised in rather general terms, and second, accounts of why people participate are therefore somewhat static, emphasising factors that predispose people to protest over more dynamic factors that stimulate protest. This undermines theoretical explanations of action based on rational choice and privileges more sociological accounts of behaviour. By adopting a novel methodological approach and analysing change over time, this article sheds light on the factors that 'trigger' protest. In doing so, it shows that the dynamics of protest can be expressed successfully within a rational choice framework.     

Parliamentary questions and oversight in the European Union

Delegation in the European Union (EU) involves a series of principal‐agent problems, and the various chains of delegation involve voters, parties, parliaments, governments, the European Commission and the European Parliament. While the literature has focused on how government parties attempt to monitor EU affairs through committees in national parliaments and through Council committees at the EU level, much less is known about the strategies opposition parties use to reduce informational deficits regarding European issues. This article argues that the European Parliament (EP) offers opposition parties an arena to pursue executive oversight through the use of written parliamentary questions. Using a novel dataset on parliamentary questions in the EP, this article examines why Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) ask questions of specific Commissioners. It transpires that MEPs from national opposition parties are more likely to ask questions of Commissioners. Questions provide these parties with inexpensive access to executive scrutiny. This finding has implications for the study of parliamentary delegation and party politics inside federal legislatures such as the EP.     

DOES PERFORMANCE INFORMATION ABOUT PUBLIC SERVICES AFFECT CITIZENS' PERCEPTIONS,SATISFACTION, AND VOICE BEHAVIOUR? FIELD EXPERIMENTS WITH ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE PERFORMANCE INFORMATION

We evaluate a theory of the effects of publishing performance information on citizens' collective voice to local providers about public service performance and the perceptions and attitudes that influence their voice. Field experiments show that information about low absolute and relative performance of local government household waste recycling services lowers citizens' perceptions of performance, and information about high absolute and relative performance raises perceived performance. Relative information makes citizens judge local providers as being more responsible for outcomes in the case of high performance, suggesting that systems for comparative performance reporting increase local accountability for outcomes. Negativity bias is evident, with information about low absolute performance reducing citizens' satisfaction but information about high performance not raising satisfaction. Information about low performance did not trigger collective voice protest behaviour as hypothesized, suggesting that providers who need citizens' collective voice the most do not get it.     

NUDGING,SHOVING, AND BUDGING: BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMIC‐INFORMED POLICY

In recent years, behavioural economics has gained considerable traction in the policy discourse, with a particular conceptual framework called libertarian paternalism, which informs nudge policy, dominating. Libertarian paternalism requires policies to protect individual liberty, to be focused specifically upon improving the welfare of those towards whom the intervention is targeted, and to be informed by the findings of behavioural economics. In practice, however, many of the interventions that are being advocated as nudges do not meet all of these criteria. Moreover, libertarian paternalism is not the only framework in which behavioural economics can inform policy. Coercive paternalism and behavioural regulation, frameworks that respectively underpin shove and budge policies, both use behavioural economics to inform public policy, and both face their own set of limitations. This article attempts to bring a degree of intellectual clarity to the potentially important contribution that behavioural economics can make to public policy.     

National and Local Vulnerability to Climate‐Related Disasters in Latin America: The Role of Social Asset‐Based Adaptation

The Latin American region is particularly prone to climate‐related natural hazards. However, this article argues that natural hazards are only partly to blame for the region's vulnerability to natural disasters with quantitative evidence suggesting instead that income per capita and inequality are main determinants of natural disaster mortality in Latin America. Locally, the region's poor are particularly susceptible to climate‐related natural hazards. As a result of their limited access to capital, adaptation based on social assets constitutes an effective coping strategy. Evidence from Bolivia and Belize illustrates the importance of social assets in protecting the most vulnerable against natural disasters.