Policy monitoring and policy analysis

In this article we introduce a policy analytic technique that we call “policy monitoring.” Using data from the Environmental Protection Agency's Hazardous Waste Division, we demonstrate how the technique can be employed in actual practice. The case study demonstrates that EPA enforcements were responsive to stimuli emanating from outside the agency. In particular, relevant congressional committees were able to influence and effect change in the EPA's policy. In addition to demonstrating how policy monitoring can be employed, we also discuss how it can be used in other policy analytic situations.     

Halfway competitive markets and ineffective regulation: the American health care system

Since the late 1960s the U.S. has attempted to develop a strategy for controlling the rate of growth of health care spending. During the 1970s this strategy relied heavily on various forms of regulation. Some regulatory programs were partially successful in moderating spending increases, but they generated significant opposition--particularly from powerful provider groups, who successfully convinced Congress and the states to dismantle most of the regulatory structure and to substitute various forms of competitive approaches to controlling spending. Some of these competitive strategies have been successful in increasing the efficiency of subsections of our health system. But they too have produced "losers," and the government has been pressured to enter the system to minimize their losses. The net result has been a political stalemate between halfway competitive markets and ineffective regulation. With the rate of health care spending growth near historic levels, it is likely that the 1990s will bring a return to a stronger role for government regulation. But it is unlikely that we are any more willing to tolerate the negative fallout from regulation today than we were in the 1970s, and therefore we predict that the proportion of GNP going to health care will continue to grow throughout the remainder of this century.     

Sincere and strategic voters: An Israeli study

The theoretical literature on voting behavior has shown that a rational voter may sometimes decide to vote for a candidate or party that does not constitute his or her first preference. Such voters are traditionally called strategic voters, in contrast to voters who act sincerely, i.e., those who always vote for their first preference regardless of how others are likely to vote. After discussing some of the problems associated with the definition of these two types of voters and suggesting a new operational definition, some attitudes and characteristics of these two types of voters are investigated. It was found that strategic voters constitute a very small percentage of the entire electorate, that their education level is significantly higher than that of sincere voters, that they tend more often to believe that polls influence voters' decisions and hence tend to delay their own final voting decision, that they tend more often than sincere voters to support small parties but do not tend more often than sincere voters to switch the party they decide to support from one election to the next, and that there is no significant difference between them and sincere voters regarding which governing coalition should/will form following an election.     

The Psychology of Coercion Failure: How Reactance Explains Resistance to Threats

When confronted with coercive threats, targets often stand firm rather than back down. We identify one important yet unrecognized factor that causes actors to resist threats: psychological reactance. Reactance theory explains that when someone perceives a threat to their freedom to make choices, they attempt to restore their autonomy by refusing to capitulate. The result is unwillingness to concede to coercion that extends beyond rational incentives. We test for reactance as a cause of coercion failure with two novel experiments. Each experiment pairs a coercive threat treatment with a matched “natural costs” counterpart that imposes the same choice on the target without intentional action by a coercer. Controlling for prominent alternative explanations, including costs, benefits, power, credibility, and reputation, we find that the targets of threats capitulate less frequently and more often support aggression against their opponents.     

人奶交易之公序良俗的法律探析

公序良俗原则由于其不确定性,历来备受争议。近年来兴起的人奶交易又引发了对公序良俗原则的探讨,对公序良俗的反思有利于充实该原则框架体系,完善其实践运用功能。文章试图通过对公序良俗概念及司法适用的法理分析,结合现实条件对人奶交易的公序良俗规范提出有益建议,从而维护社会秩序。