Five Challenges to Legalizing Economic and Social Rights

In recent years, dozens of human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) across the globe have begun to advocate for economic and social rights, which represents a significant expansion of the human rights movement. This article investigates a central strategy that NGOs have pursued to realize these rights: legalization. Legalization involves specifying rights as valid legal rules and enforcing them through judicial or quasi-judicial processes. After documenting some of the progress made toward legalization, the article analyzes five unique challenges involved in legalizing economic and social rights. It is important to identify these challenges because they must be overcome if the human rights movement wishes to refute the notion that economic and social rights are inherently non-justiciable (and therefore, to some, invalid as rights). These challenges also point to the possibility that legalization is not the only, or even the best, strategic pathway to realize economic and social rights effectively.

Der sogenannte Auffüllungsanspruch bei der Mietkaution – insbesondere in der Insolvenz

In einem rezenten Judikat hatte sich der OGH mit einer zentralen Frage zur Mietkaution zu befassen. Entscheidungswesentlich war, ob und aus welchem Rechtsgrund der Bestandgaber im Fall von Mietzinsrückständen die Wiederauffüllung der vom Bestandnehmer bestellten Kaution auf den ursprünglichen erlegten Betrag verlangen kann. Zu prüfen war dabei auch die Behandlung dieses Anspruchs in der Insolvenz des Bestandnehmers. Der Beitrag stellt die wesentlichen Aussagen der Entscheidung vor, analysiert ihre Konsequenzen kritisch und zieht Schlussfolgerungen für die Praxis.     

Should the Law Convict Those Who Act from Conviction? Reflections on a Demands-of-Conscience Criminal Defense

How should the judge or jury in a just criminal court treat a civil disobedient, someone who performs a conscientiously motivated communicative breach of the criminal law? Kimberley Brownlee contends that all else equal a court of law should neither convict nor punish such offenders. Though I agree with this conclusion, I contend that Brownlee mischaracterizes the nature of the criminal defense to which civil disobedients are entitled. Whereas Brownlee maintains that such actors ought to be excused for their criminal breach, I argue that they ought to enjoy a justification defense. Acts of civil disobedience are not (morally) wrongful violations of the law for which an actor ought not to be blamed; rather, they are violations of the law that are not (morally) wrong in virtue of their illegality. It is the absence of wrongdoing, and not merely the absence of fault, that renders the conviction and punishment of those who perform acts of civil disobedience inappropriate.