Reviews and commentary

The (a)ble, (b)rave, and “c” of sis

Anthony Cave Brown: The Secret Life of Sir Stewart Graham Menzies, Spymaster to Winston Churchill Macmillan, New York, 1987, 830 p., $25.00.

Sentries in the Senate

William S. Cohen and George J. Mitchell: Men of Zeal: A Candid Inside Story of the Iran‐Contra Hearings Viking Press, New York, 1988, 350 p., $19.95.

Disappointing Stalin: Cold War Compromises

Christopher Simpson: Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effect on the Cold War Weidenfeld &; Nicolson, New York, 1988, 290 p., $19.95.

Flaws in the Perfect Book on Technowar

James William Gibson: The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam The Atlantic Monthly Press, Boston, Mass., 1986, 523 p., $24.95.     

The changing nature of the transatlantic link: U.S. approaches and implications for Central and Eastern Europe

This article examines the changing security, economic and diplomatic components of the transatlantic link, with a particular focus on Washington's approach and implications for Central and Eastern Europe. The United States continues to play an essential role as security underwriter in the region, but the military dimension of the transatlantic relationship is transforming and will result in greater burdens on Europeans. Economic links between the U.S. and Central Europe are developing more strongly than generally understood, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is likely to drive both political and economic ties. Unconventional gas developments are enhancing U.S. engagement in European energy markets. Finally, the U.S. remains keen to engage its European partners on a broad agenda of global and regional issues and retains its own interests in working particularly with Central and Eastern European countries to lend stability to ‘wider Europe’.     

The Lebanese Hizballah and Israeli Counterterrorism

This article examines Israel's attempts to weaken and defeat the Lebanese Hizballah. It reviews Hizballah's rise after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Hizballah's successful effort to force Israeli forces to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000, the 2006 war, and Israeli attempts to deter Hizballah. The article argues that Israel has largely failed to defeat Hizballah militarily and politically. Israel's experience offers lessons for how terrorist groups learn, the effectiveness of terrorist attrition strategies against casualty-sensitivity states, the difficulties in coercing terrorist groups, and the importance of an information strategy. Finally, Israel's clash with Hizballah indicates the importance of thinking of groups that are large and multi-faceted from a counterinsurgency paradigm.     

Curious Victory: Explaining Israel's Suppression of the Second Intifada

The article examines Israel's successes and failures during the Second Intifada. It argues that Israel's advances came from an effective counterterrorism campaign involving a mix of military operations, defensive measures, and in particular improved intelligence gathering. Domestic resilience also proved strong in the face of a brutal terrorism campaign. Yet long-term victory remains elusive for Israel. Deterrence, always difficult against terrorist groups, is growing harder for Israel. Hamas's control of Gaza, and the mistrust and hatred sown during the Second Intifada, have hindered a political deal between Israel and moderate Palestinians. Much of what went into successful counterterrorism, notably the security barrier and the aggressive campaign of raids and arrests, does not jibe with most visions of what peace would look like and makes a deal harder to achieve. To make a peace deal work, Israeli counterterrorism must change, with measures including relocating parts of the security barrier, bolstering moderate Palestinian politicians, and working with, as opposed to undermining, Palestinian security forces in the West Bank.     

An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far?

This article examines whether the outbreak of an insurgency after the U.S. invasion of Iraq was an avoidable policy failure or whether the structural conditions surrounding the occupation made such an outbreak inevitable. Several U.S. policy mistakes, in particular the deployment of too few troops, a lack of comprehensive political and military planning for the occupation, disbanding the Iraqi military, the failure to establish a government in waiting, and overly aggressive de-Baathification, greatly exacerbated rather than ameliorated the various structural problems. More fundamentally, structure and policy choices interacted at all levels to explain the Iraq failure. The unavoidable conditions that coalition forces encountered in Iraq—a divided society devastated by years of war, sanctions, and misrule—and the political context in the United States made the challenge for successful policy execution difficult. This structure constrained and delimited the options open to U.S. policy makers but, even within those narrow limits, the United States made many bad choices that further diminished the chances of success.

A particularly important series of policy mistakes occurred well in advance of the buildup to war itself. The orientation of the U.S. armed forces away from counterinsurgency, the failure to establish a political settlement before invasion, and other controllable policy choices in the prewar period all led to enormous difficulties during the occupation itself. Thus, by the time of the invasion, these policy choices had become almost like structural constraints and the failures had a snowballing effect, making policy corrections far more difficult.     

Book Reviews

John F. Manley and Kenneth M. Dolbeare, The Case Against the Constitution: From the Antifederalists to the Present (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp, Inc., 1987), 199 pp.

Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 328 pp.

Sheldon S. Wolin, The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 228 pp.

Peter Brown, Minority Party: Why Democrats Face Defeat in 1992 and Beyond (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1991).     

Reluctant Participants in Restorative Justice? Youthful Offenders and Their Parents

This paper examines offender and parental involvement in the Vermont Juvenile Restorative Panels Program. In this program, juvenile offenders on probation appear before citizen‐run boards to negotiate the terms of their probation, which may include apologies, community service, restitution, and competency development tasks. Victims and parents of the offender also participate. This study reports findings from a qualitative analysis of 22 cases, including observations of panel meetings and interviews with program coordinators, offenders, parents, and victims. We find that offenders vary in level of participation as well as in their willingness to take responsibility. Parents do not understand the program well, worry about their child’s likelihood of compliance, but generally support the goals of the program. The implications of these findings for restorative practices with juveniles are explored in the concluding section.