Let's stick together: Understanding Africa's secessionist deficit

Over the last 40 years, Africa has experienced relatively fewersecessionist conflicts than most other regions of the world,even though it is otherwise plagued with political violenceand its countries tend to display a higher prevalence of manyof the factors usually associated with separatism. After empiricallyestablishing Africa’s secessionist deficit, this articlereviews the few existing explanations for it before articulatinga theory which singles out the benefits to African regionalelites (and those who depend on them) of weak sovereign states.In Africa as elsewhere, the article argues, regional leaderscan be expected to capitalize on local grievances and promotesecessions if the potential rewards of a separatist state, inthe absence of international recognition, outweigh the potentialrewards associated with control or partial control of institutionsof the sovereign national state. What distinguishes Africanelites is the relatively greater material returns to sovereigntythat they face. Given the continent’s poverty, the undiversifiednature and commodity dependence of its economies, and the relativelack of accountability of state power, Africa offers a significantmaterial premium to internationally recognized sovereignty,tilting the odds for elites in favour of staying within thestate, even if they do not immediately benefit from power atthe centre. The article then tests the argument against actualAfrican cases of secession, showing that they are usually afunction of variations in the relative rewards of sovereignty.In conclusion, it argues that Africa’s weak sovereigntyequilibrium has contributed to its failure to develop.     

Income,Democracy, and Leader Turnover

While some believe that economic development prompts democratization, others contend that both result from distant historical causes. Using the most comprehensive estimates of national income available, I show that development is associated with more democratic government—but mostly in the medium run (10 to 20 years). This is because higher income tends to induce breakthroughs to more democratic politics only after an incumbent dictator leaves office. And in the short run, faster economic growth increases the ruler's survival odds. Leader turnover appears to matter because of selection: In authoritarian states, reformist leaders tend to either democratize or lose power relatively quickly, so long‐serving leaders are rarely reformers. Autocrats also become less activist after their first year in office. This logic helps explain why dictators, concerned only to prolong their rule, often inadvertently prepare their countries for jumps to democracy after they leave the scene.     

Popular Mobilizations in Lebanon: From Anti-System to Sectarian Claims

In Lebanon, the Arab uprising is often analyzed through the lens of the side effects the Syrian uprising had on the country thanks to the massive refugee influx and involvement of Sunni and Shia Lebanese in Syria’s battleground. In fact, popular mobilizations happened prior to and during the current crisis as two different types of effects of the Arab uprisings at large. First, in late 2010 emerged an anti-sectarian movement that brought up an anti-system claim in line with other Arab social movements targeting authoritarian regimes and corruption. Second, the Sunni radical mobilization that started in Saida in 2011 around the popular Imam Sheikh Assir gathered resentments toward the Shia leading party Hizbullah as involved alongside the Syrian regime and, surprisingly, adopting an active minority mobilization strategy. Both movements conducted demonstrations of different types (from classic marches to on-road sit-ins) starting from a completely opposite perspective and in a very different environment: when the anti-sectarian mobilization faded, the sectarian one rose. This article will try to address the historical process of both mobilizations and assess their differences in light of several mobilization theories. It intends to raise questions about the types of actors involved, their discourses and justifications, and the contextual local and political environments.