Voluntary Narrative Disclosures by Local Governments: A Comparative Analysis of the Textual Complexity of Mayoral and Chairpersons' Letters in Annual Reports

Research on local government annual reports has been limited, particularly in relation to report narratives. This study aims to determine whether characteristics of narratives vary between the reports of local governments and listed companies. After considering the nature of the potential report audiences it was predicted that, if writers consider their audience, local government report narratives would be easier to read, less likely to be obfuscated, and use fewer passive sentences than those in corporate reports. The results suggest that mayoral letters exhibit higher reading ease and are less likely to be obfuscated than their corporate counterparts but they are also shorter and contain more passive constructions, making conclusions about readability and understandability ambiguous. This research acquaints readers with important aspects to consider when preparing or evaluating narrative reports.     

The Decline and Fall of Democracy in Venezuela: Ten Theses

This paper presents an argument about the causes of the decline and fall of the 1958–1999 system of democratic politics, commonly known in Spanish as puntofijista , in Venezuela. Competing explanations of this process are evaluated, and an interim assessment of President Hugo Chávez and his political project is offered.     

Income,Democracy, and Leader Turnover

While some believe that economic development prompts democratization, others contend that both result from distant historical causes. Using the most comprehensive estimates of national income available, I show that development is associated with more democratic government—but mostly in the medium run (10 to 20 years). This is because higher income tends to induce breakthroughs to more democratic politics only after an incumbent dictator leaves office. And in the short run, faster economic growth increases the ruler's survival odds. Leader turnover appears to matter because of selection: In authoritarian states, reformist leaders tend to either democratize or lose power relatively quickly, so long‐serving leaders are rarely reformers. Autocrats also become less activist after their first year in office. This logic helps explain why dictators, concerned only to prolong their rule, often inadvertently prepare their countries for jumps to democracy after they leave the scene.