Norms versus Action: Why Voters Fail to Sanction Malfeasance in Brazil

We show that Brazilian voters strongly sanction malfeasant mayors when presented with hypothetical scenarios but take no action when given the same information about their own mayor. Partnering with the State Accounts Court of Pernambuco, we conducted a field experiment during the 2016 municipal elections in which the treatment group received information about official wrongdoing by their mayor. The treatment has no effect on self‐reported voting behavior after the election, yet when informing about malfeasance in the context of a vignette experiment, we are able to replicate the strong negative effect found in prior studies. We argue that voters' behavior in the abstract reflects the comparatively strong norm against corruption in Brazil. Yet on Election Day, their behavior is constrained by factors such as attitudes toward local political dynasties and the greater salience of more pressing concerns like employment and health services.     

The Good,the Bad and the Ugly: Do Attractive Politicians Get a ‘Break’ When They are Involved in Scandals?

Political Behavior - In general, politicians involved in scandals of various natures are punished by voters. Good-looking politicians, on the contrary, are rewarded by voters. Almost fifty years of...     

Intimate Partner Violence Reports During the COVID-19 Pandemic First Year in Portuguese Urban Areas: A Brief Report

Journal of Family Violence - The COVID-19 pandemic raised concerns about the exponential growth of intimate partner violence (IPV), both in numbers and severity. This brief report aims to describe...     

Thought Crime and the Treason Act 1351

Liverpool Law Review - Has there ever been a law criminalizing mental states in themselves? We show that there has been, and still is: the Treason Act 1351. We argue for what we call ‘the...     

Is Inheritance Morally Distinctive?

This paper examines a rarely-discussed argument for the right to bequeath wealth. This argument, popular among libertarians, asserts that opposition to the practice of inheritance is prone to over-generalize, such that opponents of inheritance cannot avoid condemning other uses of private property, like gift-giving. The argument is motivated by an interesting methodological claim, namely, that the morality of bequest ought to be evaluated from the perspective of the donor, and not evaluated in ways that invoke the effects of bequest on the distribution of wealth. This paper argues that this donor-centric approach ultimately favors restricting the right of bequest. Specifically, I maintain that bequest generally carries a lower opportunity cost than other uses of property. Accordingly, inheritance tax is less coercive than other taxes, and bequest is less obviously as generous an act as gift giving. While the arguments made here will encourage traditional opponents of inheritance (such as egalitarians), I also suggest why they might be welcomed by at least some types of libertarian.     

When War Brings Peace: A Dynamic Model of the Rivalry Process

This study develops a dynamic model of the rivalry process, explicitly connecting the conflicts that form rivalries. The model demonstrates how these conflicts combine to form an especially conflict‐prone relationship. Using numerical simulations of the model, I deduce and test a hypothesis connecting dyadic conflict and rivalry termination. High‐concentration conflicts increase the probability of rivalry termination by causing a sharp and sustained drop in public support for future military action. Dyadic conflict between rivals can bring peace, under the right circumstances. The article concludes with a discussion of the model's implications for policymakers seeking to limit international violence.