Challenging the "Received View": De-demonizing Hamas

Abstract

Violence against abortion clinics and other activities directed toward patients and staff of abortion facilities have been termed terrorism by the pro‐choice movement. However, the Federal Bureau of Investigation denies that these actions are terrorism. Instances of abortion clinic violence for 1982–1987 were examined in order to determine whether there is a correspondence between these incidents and definitions or models of terrorism. It appears that these incidents do fit the classification of “limited political” or ‘subrevolutionary” terrorism. Reasons why the FBI has made the decision not to include these acts as forms of terrorism are entertained. One is that current international tensions have resulted in a preoccupation with only certain types of events which for administrative, i.e., juris‐dictional, reasons have come to essentialize terrorism. Another explanation, posited by pro‐choice activists, is that the FBI's decision is a consequence of political influence: the current administration is openly anti‐choice.     

The Conditional Nature of Political Risk: How Home Institutions Influence the Location of Foreign Direct Investment

What determines whether countries' institutions attract or deter investment? Although existing theories predict that multinational enterprises (MNEs) avoid locations where institutions cannot constrain public and private actors' opportunistic behavior, we argue host institutions' attractiveness depends on firms' home environment. Home country institutions shape firms' practices and capabilities, thus helping to determine the environments that firms are best prepared to face abroad. We test our predictions using multiple data sets at different levels of analysis: firm‐level data on MNEs' foreign subsidiaries, data on bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) positions, and longitudinal data on bilateral FDI flows. We find that states with independent judiciaries are particularly attractive to investment from countries also possessing independent courts. Similarly, countries with low judicial independence disproportionately send FDI to countries lacking independent judiciaries. These findings' implications challenge conventional wisdom: “Good” institutions may not attract all investors, and “bad” institutions may not always deter, as current research suggests.     

Staggered Terms for the US Senate: Origins and Irony

This article provides the first detailed study of the origins of staggered Senate terms, which typically have been interpreted as part of the framers’ intent to create an insulated, stable, and conservative Senate. I draw upon three sources of evidence—the meaning and application of “rotation” in revolutionary America, the deliberations and decisions at the Constitutional Convention, and the arguments during Ratification—to show that the origins of and intentions behind staggered terms offer little support for the dominant interpretation. Instead, staggered terms, a mechanism to promote “rotation” or turnover of membership, were added to the Constitution as a compromise to offset, not augment, the Senate's longer terms by exposing a legislative chamber with long individual tenure to more frequent electoral influence and change.