Technology policy and defense conversion in Israel, 1967–1995

Technology policies and their effect on technology transfer from defense to civilian industries in Israel from 1967 to 1995 are explored. Defense technology policy is found to drive the growth of the defense industry and to limit defense conversion to commercialization initiatives developed primarily through intra-organizational technology transfer. The case of the Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) is presented. Also the development of national technology policy in Israel is traced and found wanting. Civilian and defense technology policies are found to be uncoordinated with each other and together are incapable of producing interorganizational technology transfer so as to significantly effect defense conversion on a wide number of economic actors particularly small firms. To achieve a socially effective defense conversion process (in which technologies are transferred from defense firms to many economic actors), the analysis suggests that a national technology policy should be designed and implemented under Prime Minister's leadership.     

A method of choosing the extractant for the recovery of tin from the internal organs of a human cadaver

The analysis of naphthenic acid revealed that they may be used for tin detection in the cadaveric material due to their high complex-forming ability. Method of extraction-atomic absorption tin determination in human organs was developed on the basis of naphthenic acid use. Modified method which differs from the common one by higher sensitivity and selectivity is presented.     

Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking Government

This article analyzes public and private law enforcement whenthe government is motivated by rent seeking. A rent-seekinggovernment seeks primarily to maximize revenue. The articleconcludes as follows: (1) if offenders have sufficient wealth,a rent-seeking government is more aggressive than a social-welfare-maximizinggovernment in enforcing laws against minor crimes (such as parkingviolations) but more lax in enforcing laws against major crimes;(2) competitive private enforcement is usually better and neverworse than monopolistic private enforcement; (3) The choicebetween competitive private enforcement and public enforcementdepends on which is cheaper and on the severity of the offense.     

NETWORK REGULATION: THE MANY FACES OF ACCESS

Telecommunications regulation has experienced a fundamentalshift from rate regulation to increased reliance on compelledaccess, perhaps best exemplified by the Telecommunications Actof 1996's imposition of no fewer than four new access requirements.Unfortunately, each access requirement is governed by a separateset of rules for determining both the scope and the price ofaccess. The resulting ad hoc regime has created difficult definitionalproblems and opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. In thisarticle we propose a system inspired by the discipline of mathematicsknown as graph theory that integrates all of the different formsof access into a single analytical framework. This system separatesdifferent access regimes into five categories: (1) retail access,(2) wholesale access, (3) interconnection access, (4) platformaccess, and (5) unbundled access. It also provides insightsinto how each type of access complicates the already difficultproblems of network configuration and management and introducesinefficient biases into decisions about network capacity anddesign. The approach we propose also provides insights intothe transaction cost implications of the different types ofaccess. Drawing on the Coasean theory of the firm, our approachexamines the tradeoffs between internal governance costs andthe external transaction costs of providing access to offera theory of network boundaries. This framework shows how accessregulation distorts networks' natural boundaries and providesa basis for evaluating whether private ordering through marketswould lead to more efficient network design.     

A CRITIQUE OF PROFESSOR CHURCH'S REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF VERTICAL AND CONGLOMERATE MERGERS ON COMPETITION

We discuss Professor Jeffrey Church's report to the EuropeanCommission in 2004 on the effects of vertical restraints andmergers. Although thorough and accurate, the report could bemisinterpreted by practitioners, as it does not emphasize thatmarket power is only a necessary condition for harm to competition,and that most vertical mergers that present the possibilityof competitive harm also present economic efficiencies thatare intrinsic to the integration.     

The effect of authority and social influence on eyewitness suggestibility and person recognition

This study investigated the influence of an authority figure on eyewitness identification. Participants watched a staged crime and then were administered a photo lineup by either an authority (policeman) or non-authority figure (civilian). Participants in the authority condition were more likely to choose a lineup member than those in the non-authority condition. There was no effect of authority, however, on the accuracy of the identification decisions. The lack of a deleterious effect suggests that the presence of a police officer during identification procedures does not create an unduly suggestive situation or have undesirable effects on eyewitness identification decisions. Although witnesses' choosing behaviors did not increase the rate of identification errors, the effect of the administrator's authority on choosing was reduced when unbiased instructions (vs. biased instructions) were presented to the witnesses. Thus, support was found for the use of neutral instructions during eyewitness identification procedures.