Veto Players and Civil War Duration

Civil wars show a remarkable variation in how long they last. Some end within days; others continue for decades. What explains the extreme intractability of some wars while others are resolved quickly? This article argues that conflicts with multiple actors who must approve a settlement (veto players) are longer because there are fewer acceptable agreements, information asymmetries are more acute, and shifting alliances and incentives to hold out make negotiation more difficult. This veto player approach to explaining variation in civil war duration is tested using a new dataset containing monthly data on all parties to each civil war begun since World War II. The statistical analysis shows a strong correlation between the number of veto players and the duration of civil war.     

Key longitudinal-experimental studies in criminology

Following the tradition of Joan McCord's work, this paper reviews longitudinal-experimental studies in criminology with community samples of at least 100 persons, follow-up periods of at least 5 years, personal interviews, and measures of offending. The main advantages of such studies are in investigating both the natural history of development (including the effects of risk/protective factors and life events) and the impact of interventions on offending. This paper also reviews advantages and problems of prospective longitudinal surveys, randomized experiments, and longitudinal-experimental studies in criminology. Four key longitudinal-experimental studies were conducted by Joan McCord, Richard Tremblay, Lawrence Schweinhart and David Olds. Other studies have been conducted, or are currently under way, but no criminological study has yet been published with several years of personal data on participants both before and after an intervention.Joan McCord Award Lecture given at the American Society of Criminology, Toronto, Canada.     

The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public International Law

Though many years in the making, the UN Human Rights Norms forCorporations only registered on the radars of most states, corporationsand civil society organisations in August 2003 when they beganto move up the ladder of the United Nation's policy-making processes.Since then they have been subject to intense, and sometimesintemperate, debate, scrutiny and controversy. A particularlegal feature of the deliberations has been the focus on theclosely related questions of the legal standing of the Normsin their present format (namely, an imperfect draft, and therefore,of no direct legal force), and what they might become (possibly—thoughnot likely soon—a treaty that speaks to corporations butbinds states). A potent mix of distrust and suspicion, vestedinterests, politics and economics has given rise to a greatdeal of grand-standing and cant concerning these questions andhow they might be answered. In this article, the authors explorethe history of the Norms and the form and content of the debatethat surrounds them, in their attempt to disentangle the legalfrom the rest. That said, the article also focuses on the realpoliticking of the circumstances in which the Norms now findthemselves and it seeks to offer some guidance as to where theNorms—or at least their substance, if not their form—mightgo from here.     

Influence of electricity on post-mortal body temperature

In a case of suicidal application of electricity differences between the rectal temperature of the body and the suspected time of death were observed.In order to answer the question whether an electric current from hand to hand over >30 min led to a rise in body temperature FEM-based computer simulations and animal experiments were carried out. Both resulted in a warming of the soft parts in the arm without warming the body core. Thus a temperature-based estimation of the time since death can also be used in cases with electricity as the cause of death. Besides, in the animal experiment we found a spontaneous rise in the body core temperature even without application of electricity which may be a reason for the typical temperature plateau after death.     

An experimental study of a therapeutic boot camp: Impact on impulses, attitudes and recidivism

Two hundred thirty four adult male inmates entering prison were randomly assigned to an early release program in either a correctional boot camp or a large, traditional prison in the Maryland state correctional system. Boot camp releasees had marginally lower recidivism compared to those released from the traditional prison. A pre-test, post-test self report survey indicated the boot camp program had little impact on criminogenic characteristics except for a lowering of self control. In contrast, inmates in prison became more antisocial, lower in self control, worse in anger management, and reported more criminal tendencies by the end of their time in prison. Criminogenic attitudes and impulses were significantly associated with recidivism. The impact of the boot camp diminished to non-significance when antisocial attitudes or anger management problems were added to the models predicting recidivism. Implications for jurisdictions considering whether to operate correctional boot camps are discussed.     

Race as a factor in university admissions

In two recent cases, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306. (2003) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244. (2003), the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause permitted state schools to use race-sensitive admissions in order to obtain the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body. The diversity-based argument for race-sensitive admissions, scholarships, awards, and other opportunities at universities should have been rejected because it does not consider the full range of costs and benefits and because the more narrow educational effects probably weigh against such programs. However, this does not suggest that applicants’ race, ethnicity, and gender should be ignored. Rather the same consideration that led to the defeat of the diversity argument, i.e., reasoning capacity, supports the consideration of demographic factors. However, attention to such factors further undermines the consequentialist case for affirmative action.     

The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Protection: The Case of Software

The end of the twentieth century was marked by a sea change in global governance in the realm of intellectual property rights (IPRs). Whereas countries historically retained substantial autonomy with regard to what they defined as intellectual "property" and the rights granted to the owners of intellectual property, the 1990s witnessed the establishment of new global obligations regarding national practices. This paper focuses on the case of software "piracy" to assess the mechanisms by which the new global obligations for the treatment of IPRs are transmitted from the international to the national levels. We first consider a set of national-level factors that many scholars have shown to be important determinants of IPR policy. We then supplement the standard emphasis on domestic factors with an analysis of new transnational factors: countries' multilateral obligations under the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and bilateral pressures from the United States to increase the protection of IPRs. Population-averaged panel data models are used to assess the effects of these national and transnational determinants on levels of software piracy in 80 countries from 1994 to 2002. Our results indicate that membership in the WTO and bilateral pressures from the United States—particularly pressures that offer reciprocal concessions—lead to substantial increases in levels of protection in rich and poor countries. There is, in short, a new international political economy of intellectual property.