Technological, economic, and political feasibility in OSHA's Air Contaminants Standard

In 1989, after almost two decades of substance-by-substance standard setting, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) promulgated its Air Contaminants Standard, imposing new exposure limits for 376 toxic substances encountered in U.S. industry. In marked contrast to earlier regulations, the Air Contaminants Standard has generated relatively little industry opposition. This paper analyzes the standard in the context of the twenty-year debate over the appropriate role for technological feasibility and economic compliance costs in occupational health policy. The political feasibility of the new standard is traced to OSHA's abandonment of "technology forcing" in favor of reliance on "off-the-shelf" technologies already in use in major firms. While important as an embodiment of OSHA's new "generic" approach to regulation, the Air Contaminants Standard cannot serve as a model for future occupational health policy, due to its reliance on informal, closed-door mechanisms for establishing regulatory priorities and permissible exposure limits.     

Child witnesses and the confrontation clause

InMaryland v. Craig, the United States Supreme Court relied heavily on a brief prepared by a committee of the American Psychology-Law Society on behalf of the American Psychological Association (APA). The APA brief concluded that sexually abused children may be particularly vulnerable to distress in the legal process, especially when forced to confront the defendant face to face, and that such acute distress may be inconsistent with the state's interests in promotion of reliable testimony and child welfare. APA also argued that psychological theory and research provide foundations for individualized determination of the need for measures to protect children from face-to-face confrontation. *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** AFE06051 00002     

Technology transfer in the navy: The historical background

This report reviews technology transfer in light of the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980. Following a brief introduction, a section on “Definitions” explains the several meanings that the phrase “technology transfer” now carries in policy discussions. The next section, on “Passive Technology Transfer”, reviews traditional Department of Defense scientific and technical information programs that relate to technology transfer. A section on “Military Industrial Transfer” examines technology transfer from the Defense Department to private industry, expecially to defense contractors. A section on “The Stevenson-Wydler Act and Active Technology Transfer” describes the principal provisions of the new act and why Congress passed it. The next two sections, on “NASA’s Technology Transfer Program” and “The Federal Laboratory Consortium” outline the two existing Government programs Congress relied upon in developing ideas for the new law. A section on “Implementation of the Stevenson-Wydler Act”, discusses several important issues that must be considered by Navy laboratory management as the new law is put into effect in the Navy. Finally, a brief conclusion emphasizes the major point of the report: That Congress, in passing the Stevenson-Wydler Act, did not fully consider what relationship the new technology transfer programs it was requiring in the Executive Branch should bear to existing programs with similar purposes. If the public interest is to be served, the report argues, the Navy must consciously and carefully determine the proper nature of this relationship.